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THE ROLE OF ACCESS IN CHARITABLE TAX 
EXEMPTION 
JOHN D. COLOMBO* 
I. INTRODUCTION: EXEMPTION IN A COMMERCIALLY—ORIENTED WORLD 
Every year when I teach my course on tax-exempt organizations, I 
begin by asking my students to name their paradigm charity. Every year, 
the usual suspects emerge: the Salvation Army, the Red Cross, C.A.R.E. 
and other poor-relief organizations top the list. Relief of the poor has long 
been a major justification for tax exemption and in fact is one of the 
charitable purposes specifically listed in the Internal Revenue Regulations 
under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), which is the statutory grant of exemption to 
charitable organizations.1
Nevertheless, a host of organizations that do not engage in significant 
relief of the poor also are eligible for exemption. Religious organizations, 
for example, are not required to engage in poor-relief to be tax-exempt; 
neither are educational organizations.2 Within this broad category of 
organizations eligible for exemption on grounds other than relief of the 
poor are a particularly vexing category of organizations whose services 
appear strikingly similar to those provided by for-profit institutions. 
Health care organizations perhaps are the paradigm for this category. 
Although relief of the poor was the basis for exemption of hospitals prior 
to 1969, in that year the IRS adopted what has become known as the 
“community-benefit” standard for exemption, which did not require a 
hospital to treat indigent patients in order to qualify for exemption.3 
Instead, the IRS concluded that providing health care for the general 
 * Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. 
 1. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (as amended in 1990) (“[T]he term ‘charitable’ . . . 
include[s]: Relief of the poor and distressed . . . .”). 
 2. Religious organizations and educational organizations are specifically enumerated in 
§ 501(c)(3) as being presumptively exempt entities. Although all organizations applying for exempt 
status under § 501(c)(3) must meet the common-law definitions of “charity” in order to qualify for 
exemption, Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983), religious and educational 
organizations historically have been considered charitable entities at least since the 1601 Elizabethan 
Statute of Charitable Uses based upon their primary purpose (e.g., disseminating religious doctrine, 
educating the public) without regard to whether their target beneficiaries were poor. See generally 
JOHN D. COLOMBO & MARK A. HALL, THE CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION 3–5, 19–21 (1995). 
 3. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. See infra notes 14–19 and accompanying text. 
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benefit of the community could be a charitable purpose, even if indigents 
were not served.4
Since that time, a number of empirical studies of health care providers 
generally have found that—if one controls for government-owned 
hospitals and major-research hospitals—private nonprofit, tax-exempt 
hospitals do not operate much differently from for-profit counterparts in 
similar geographic areas.5 These studies confirm that the levels of 
“uncompensated care” differ little between exempt and for-profit 
providers; that the range of services provided by both are similar; and that 
under current measures of quality assessment there is little difference 
between the two.6
One natural reaction to this state of affairs (it has certainly been mine) 
is to simply dismiss exemption for nonprofit health care providers as a 
wrong-headed anachronism. Yet one has the uneasy feeling that such 
dismissal would be wrong in particular cases. For example, even though a 
private nonprofit hospital in a rural area may have an economic patient 
mix and range of services that is not much different from a for-profit big-
city counterpart, it might still have a legitimate claim to exempt status 
based on the argument that it is the sole provider for its population, and 
that for-profit providers are singularly uninterested in serving low-density 
rural areas.7 In short, the rural, community-based hospital might be 
 4. Id. 
 5. For a summary of the recent empirical evidence on these points, see Frank A. Sloan, 
Commercialism in Nonprofit Hospitals, in TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT 151, 151–68 (Burton 
Weisbrod ed., 1998). See also M. Gregg Bloche, Health Policy Below the Waterline: Medical Care 
and the Charitable Exemption, 80 MINN. L. REV. 299, 315–19 (1995) (arguing that propositions that 
nonprofit hospitals provide more in the way of public goods, such as medical education or 
uncompensated care, “are highly suspect.”); sources cited infra note 6. But see Jill R. Horwitz, Why 
We Need the Independent Sector: the Behavior, Law, and Ethics of Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 50 UCLA 
L. REV. 1345 (2003) (explaining that empirical study done by author supports claim that nonprofit 
hospitals offer more unprofitable services typically needed by the poor). 
 6. Sloan, supra note 5, at 156–63; Bloche, supra note 5 at 315–19. See also Mark McClellan & 
Douglas Staiger, Comparing Hospital Quality at For-Profit and Not-for-Profit Hospitals, in THE 
CHANGING HOSPITAL INDUSTRY 93, 104–11 (David M. Cutler ed., 2000) (finding that within 
particular markets there is some evidence that for-profits actually have higher quality than nonprofits, 
but that overall not-for-profits had a slight advantage in the treatment of elderly patients with heart 
disease, and concluding there is “an enormous amount of variation in hospital quality within the for-
profit and not-for-profit groups.”); William M. Gentry & John R. Penrod, The Tax Benefits of Not-for-
Profit Hospitals, in THE CHANGING HOSPITAL INDUSTRY 285, 294–98, 321 (David M. Cutler ed., 
2000) (noting some differences in service mix between small, under 75-bed, for-profit and nonprofit 
hospitals, but among larger hospitals differences were not statistically significant. “Patient 
characteristics . . . are remarkably similar for FP and NFP hospitals.”). 
 7. See Edward C. Norton & Douglas O. Staiger, How Hospital Ownership Affects Access to 
Care for the Uninsured, 25 RAND J. ECON. 171, 172 (1994) (presenting evidence that for-profits 
strategically locate in more affluent areas where population is well-insured). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss2/2
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providing access to health services for a group that otherwise would be 
underserved by the for-profit market.  
The health care industry, however, is hardly the only one in which the 
nagging issue of the differences between exempt and for-profit providers 
cloud exempt status. Take arts organizations, for example. It is not unusual 
for an exempt nonprofit art gallery or community theater to serve the same 
geographic area as for-profit galleries or theaters. Both galleries sell art 
and both theaters charge admission.8 So what justifies exemption for the 
nonprofit? Is it simply their decision to organize as a nonprofit entity?9 
The IRS also has held that “public-interest” law firms can be tax-exempt 
even though they do not offer services to the poor.10 Why? What really 
differentiates these law firms from the many for-profit firms that daily 
litigate class action lawsuits, often involving major issues of public 
policy? Similarly, the IRS has approved exemption for certain 
“community-development” organizations that seem to provide essentially 
the same services as for-profit investment bankers or real-estate 
developers.11 So when is an investment banker or real-estate developer 
“charitable” and when is it not? 
The central thesis of this Article is that the criterion that can and should 
be used to judge exempt status in these cases of “commercial similarity” is 
whether the organization provides access to services for previously-
underserved populations or provides specific services to the majority 
population that otherwise are not provided by the private sector. Using 
“enhancing access” as the main criterion in judging an organization’s 
entitlement to exemption makes considerable sense; after all, a major 
rationale for granting charitable tax exemption is to recognize the 
 8. See, e.g., Plumstead Theater Soc’y v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1324, 1332–33 (1980) (“Admittedly, 
the line between commercial enterprises which produce and present theatrical performances and 
nonprofit, tax-exempt organizations that do the same is not always easy to draw . . . .”); Goldsboro Art 
League v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 337 (1980) (analyzing differences between taxpayer’s services and those 
of commercial art galleries). 
 9. At least one academic theory of exemption suggests that the decision to form as a nonprofit 
evidences an altruistic goal, and that this should be enough to justify exemption. Rob Atkinson, 
Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501 (1990). 
 10. Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-2 C.B. 411 (listing requirements for exemption of public-interest law 
firm). 
 11. Rev. Rul. 74-587, 1974-2 C.B. 162 (finding that an organization that used resources to 
stimulate economic development in low-income urban area was exempt; its activities consisted 
primarily of loaning money to for-profit businesses willing to locate in urban area); Rev. Rul. 70-585, 
1970-2 C.B. 115 (discussing exempt status of several different organizations formed to provide low- or 
moderate-income housing; organizations that provided low-income housing for poor or moderate-
income housing for minority groups are exempt; organization formed to provide moderate-income 
housing in high-income, expensive community not exempt because its program “is not designed to 
provide relief to the poor or to carry out any other charitable purpose.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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pluralism-enhancing nature of such enterprises.12 Organizations that 
provide expanded access to services for those unable to obtain them as a 
result of economic, geographic, or other constraints enhance the pluralism 
objective; exemption becomes the reward for doing so. The access 
criterion also fits nicely with the major economic explanations for 
exemption, which posit that exemption helps overcome an undersupply of 
services at the intersection of private-market failure and government 
failure.13 Moreover, making access a central theme of exemption would 
force organizations to explain their mission in access terms—a process 
that in and of itself could help focus such organizations on why they differ 
from for-profit counterparts and what they should do to highlight that 
difference. 
This Article makes the case for using access as the central criterion for 
exemption in these cases in four subsequent parts. Part II reviews how IRS 
rulings and court decisions in the healthcare area already contain access-
based language and concepts. Part III expands the analysis of Part II to 
other cases in which exempt organizations arguably do things similar to 
for-profit counterparts such as community-development organizations, 
public-interest law firms, and certain kinds of “arts” organizations. Part IV 
then presents the policy case for using access as a primary criterion for 
judging exemption by arguing that the criterion is consistent with both 
economic and sociological explanations for exemption and the existence 
of nonprofit organizations.  
Part V explores the practicalities of an access-based test by developing 
in more detail the doctrinal implementation of such a test and analyzing 
how using access as a primary exemption criterion would affect the 
analysis of exempt status for a variety of organizations that arguably 
compete with for-profit providers of similar services. Again this part 
focuses heavily on health care organizations, but also applies an access 
criterion to organizations outside the health sector. The Article concludes 
that using “enhancing access” as a primary criterion for exempt status 
would simplify current doctrine, would still be consistent with theoretical 
underpinnings of exemption, and would help provide a focus point for the 
mission of nonprofit organizations that provide commercial-type services. 
 12. See infra notes 84–90 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra notes 91–95 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss2/2
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II. ACCESS IN HEALTH CARE TAX EXEMPTION 
A. Access and the Basic Community-Benefit Standard 
Prior to 1969, a hospital could qualify for charitable tax exemption 
under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) only if it operated “to the extent of its financial 
ability” to provide services to individuals unable to pay for them.14 
Although this “charity-care” standard15 was grounded in IRS regulations 
defining “charitable” for tax exemption purposes to include “relief of the 
poor,”16 in a broader sense the charity-care standard itself reflected an 
underlying policy of providing access to health services for a particular 
group, the indigent, that otherwise did not have access to such services. 
In 1969, however, the IRS adopted a rule providing alternate standard 
for exempting health care providers. In what has become known as the 
“community-benefit” standard for exemption,17 the IRS in Rev. Rul. 69-
545 held that a nonprofit hospital could qualify for charitable tax 
exemption by providing health services for the general benefit of the 
community even though the hospital limited services to patients who could 
pay.18 As noted below,19 the problems with this community-benefit 
formulation have been legendary. Standing alone, the test offers little 
guidance to distinguish “charitable” health care providers from non-
charitable ones; after all, even for-profit hospitals treat all patients in the 
community who can afford to pay. 
But there is a different way to look at the purported adoption of the 
community-benefit test in the 1969 ruling. Although the ruling never 
mentions the word “access,” and does not explicitly make access a central 
criterion of exemption, a close reading of this ruling indicates that access 
is, in fact, the common theme underlying the Service’s position. For 
 14. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202. See generally JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, 
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, CASES & MATERIALS 384–85 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter FISHMAN & 
SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGS.]; THOMAS K. HYATT & BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT 
HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS 15, 529–32 (2d ed. 2001); DOUGLAS M. MANCINO, TAXATION OF 
HOSPITALS AND HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS § 2.04[2][b] (2001); Mark A. Hall & John D. 
Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 
66 WASH. L. REV. 307, 320 (1991). 
 15. Grounding exemption for healthcare providers on free care for those unable to pay has 
become known as the “charity-care” standard. See HYATT & HOPKINS, supra note 14, at 15, 530–31. 
 16. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (as amended in 1990). 
 17. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGS., supra note 14, at 384; HYATT & HOPKINS, 
supra note 14, at 532.  
 18. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. 
 19. See infra text accompanying notes 99–103. For an extended critique of the community 
benefit test of exemption see COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 2, at 63–82 and sources cited therein. 
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example, in the ruling the IRS stressed four factors that distinguished an 
exempt hospital from a non-exempt one. These four factors were (1) a 
community board, (2) the operation of an emergency room open even to 
indigent patients, (3) an open-staff policy, and (4) treatment of 
Medicare/Medicaid patients.20 All four of these factors could be viewed as 
related to access. A community board, for example, would help ensure that 
a hospital did not ignore the health care needs of large segments of the 
community and provide access to services for the community as a whole. 
Similarly, a requirement of an open staff would keep a hospital open to 
patients of all qualified physicians ensuring broad community access to 
the hospital’s services. The requirement of an open emergency room that 
would treat even indigent patients is, of course, directly access-related 
because it ensures that primary emergency care is available to all members 
of the community. Finally, the treatment of Medicaid patients would 
ensure access by a large group of the poor via a government-
reimbursement program.  
In fact, there is some evidence in the history of Rev. Rul. 69-545 that 
these four criteria were intentionally chosen to reflect underlying concerns 
regarding access to medical care. The ruling was authored by Robert 
Bromberg, at the time a young staff attorney in the IRS, who believed that 
enactment of the Medicare and Medicaid programs in the late 1960s had 
made the charity-care standard for hospital tax exemption an 
anachronism.21 In this light, one could view the factors listed in Rev. Rul. 
69-545, particularly the factors relating to an open emergency room and 
treatment of Medicare/Medicaid patients, as Bromberg’s reformulation of 
an access-based-exemption standard borne of the notion that the prior 
access-based standard (charity care) would no longer serve its purpose.22 
 20. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. 
 21. Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C. Schaffer, Tax Administration as Health Policy: Hospitals, The 
Internal Revenue Service, and the Courts, 16 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 251, 269–70 (1991).  
 22. Fox and Schaffer stated: 
Bromberg recalls that officials at “other agencies” had convinced him that hospitals would 
only care for the poor if they participated in Medicare and Medicaid.  
. . . .  
. . . Bromberg concluded that existing tax law, with its requirement of free or below-cost care, 
was obsolete. . . . [B]ecause he had learned from his reading and interviews that increasing 
numbers of patients enter hospitals through emergency rooms, [Bromberg] “put into the 
ruling the requirement of admission to the hospital’s emergency room without regard to 
ability to pay.” 
Id. at 261–62; See also Robert Bromberg, Charity and Change: Current Problems of Tax-Exempt 
Health and Welfare Organizations in Perspective, in TAX PROBLEMS OF NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 
249 (G. Webster & J. Lehrfield eds., 1970). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss2/2
p343 Colombo book pages.doc12/22/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] THE ROLE OF ACCESS 349 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indeed, as an attorney representing the American Hospital Association 
some years later, Bromberg crafted and filed a brief in the Eastern 
Kentucky Welfare Rights case23 taking the position that the 1969 ruling 
made treatment of Medicaid patients a requirement in order to replace the 
outmoded charity-care standard with a more effective access mechanism. 
Moreover, even the D.C. Circuit seemed to adopt the view that the new 
ruling would impose a more effective access requirement than the old 
charity-care standard by stating “in the final analysis, Revenue Ruling 69-
545 may be of greater benefit to the poor than its predecessor.”24 Thus, it 
is not much of a stretch to conclude that Rev. Rul. 69-545 embodies access 
to health services as the central core of its rationale. This conclusion, 
moreover, is buttressed by subsequent IRS rulings that recognized that 
hospitals providing specialized treatment could be exempt—even without 
an open emergency room—as long as they provided their specialized 
services for the general benefit of the community25 (e.g., provided access 
to such services by the general community). 
B. Access in Other Health Care Rulings 
Rev. Rul. 69-545 is hardly the only IRS ruling on exemption for heath 
care providers that contains overtones of access as a central criterion for 
exemption. By the early 1990s, for example, the IRS was facing a 
dramatically different health care landscape than it had in 1969. A strong 
trend toward vertical integration in health care delivery systems and in 
managed care raised issues regarding the exempt status of the parent-
holding companies of “integrated delivery systems” (“IDS”s), health 
maintenance organizations (“HMO”s), and joint-venture arrangements 
between hospitals and their staff doctors.26 Physician recruitment 
incentives became a major issue as rival integrated networks competed for 
the best doctors in their service areas or attempted to lure physicians from 
 23. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 426 U.S. 26 (1976), rev’g 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 
1970), rev’g 370 F. Supp. 325 (D. D.C. 1973). The plaintiffs in Eastern Kentucky were individuals 
who claimed that they had been refused treatment by tax-exempt hospitals for lack of ability to pay. Id. 
at 26. They sued the IRS to overrule Rev. Rul. 69-545 and reimpose a charity-care requirement for tax 
exemption. Id. at 33. The plaintiffs won at the district level; before the D.C. Circuit, Bromberg 
submitted an amicus brief on behalf of the American Hospital Association that claimed that the 1969 
ruling required an open emergency room and treatment of Medicaid patients as a condition of 
exemption. The court of appeals overruled the district court decision, but the Supreme Court dismissed 
the case for lack of standing. Id. at 26. 
 24. Simon, 506 F.2d at 1289.  
 25. Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94, 95. 
 26. John D. Colombo, Health Care Reform and Federal Tax Exemption: Rethinking the Issues, 
29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 215, 228–40 (1994). 
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other locations to improve patient admissions and provide adequate 
service coverage.27 Although the IRS responded to these changes by 
attempting to apply the basic tests of Rev. Rul. 69-545, as the discussion 
below sets forth, many of the rulings on health care exemption throughout 
the 1990s reflect concerns about access on two planes: access by 
traditionally underserved populations to general health care services and 
access by the general population to specific services or procedures that 
may otherwise have been unavailable. 
In the area of IDSs and HMOs, for example, the IRS rulings all have an 
access-oriented flavor. The first of the IDS rulings, involving Friendly 
Hills Healthcare Network, focused almost exclusively on access-related-
operational characteristics to support exemption.28 These characteristics 
included many of the same themes in Rev. Rul. 69-545: an open 
emergency room providing emergency care even for those unable to pay, a 
community board, an open medical staff and treatment of Medicaid 
patients. The language used by the IRS in this ruling, however, is 
remarkably forthright in its access orientation. Thus, in discussing the 
requirements for exemption, the IRS noted in the ruling that an open 
medical staff would “make [the organization’s] services as readily 
accessible to the community as possible.”29 Similarly, in discussing 
Friendly Hills’ Medicaid participation, the IRS stressed the organization’s 
participation in these programs “in a nondiscriminatory manner” making 
available “to Medicare and Medi-Cal beneficiaries all primary, specialty, 
and diagnostic care made available to other patients.”30 The IRS also noted 
that Friendly Hills would “arrange for adequate physician participation in 
[its] clinics to ensure access to Medicare and Medi-Cal beneficiaries.”31
Two subsequent IDS rulings, Facey Medical Foundation32 and 
Harriman Jones Medical Foundation,33 contained similar access-laden 
language but with a new twist. In each ruling, the IRS emphasized that the 
exempt foundation had committed to a set amount of charity care 
($400,000 per year for Facey; $750,000 per year for Harriman).34 The use 
 27. See, e.g., MANCINO, supra note 14, at § 20.01. 
 28. Friendly Hills Exemption Ruling, reprinted in 7 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 490, 490–92 
(1993). 
 29. Id. at 491 (emphasis added). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. (emphasis added). 
 32. Facey Medical Foundation Exemption Ruling, reprinted in 7 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 828 
(1993) [hereinafter, Facey Ruling]. 
 33. Harriman Jones Medical Foundation Exemption Ruling, reprinted in 9 EXEMPT ORG. TAX 
REV. 719 (1994) [hereinafter, Harriman Ruling]. 
 34. Facey Ruling, supra note 32, at 830; Harriman Ruling, supra note 33, at 720. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss2/2
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of charity care as a criterion for exempting Facey and Harriman is curious 
in light of the IRS having officially jettisoned charity care as a 
requirement for exemption in Rev. Rul. 69-545. Nevertheless, as indicated 
below, the renewed emphasis on charity care tracked positions the IRS 
was taking at the same time in litigation dealing with the exempt status of 
HMOs, and was a clear signal that access to health services was a major 
factor in granting exemption. 
The renewed emphasis on access displayed in the IDS rulings cited 
above is mirrored in other healthcare cases and rulings released during the 
1990s. At about the same time that the IRS was issuing the first of its IDS 
rulings, for example, the IRS General Counsel’s Office was considering 
the exemption effects of certain joint-venture arrangements between 
hospitals and doctors designed to improve patient utilization (and hence 
profits) in certain outpatient facilities. These “revenue-stream-sale” 
situations involved a common fact pattern.35 A hospital with an 
underutilized facility, such as an outpatient surgery facility, would form a 
partnership with staff doctors. The partnership would then purchase the 
“revenue stream” from the outpatient facility for its current discounted 
present value based upon an outside appraisal. This purchase in essence 
paid the hospital full fair-market value for the current revenue stream 
produced by the facility. Since doctors now had a direct stake in the 
financial success of the joint venture, however, the joint-venture 
arrangement presumably would prod the doctors into referring additional 
patients to the underused facility—thus generating revenues greater than 
the current stream. These new revenues, which represented a profit over 
and above what the joint venture paid for the “old” revenue stream, would 
then be split between the hospital and doctors in whatever percentage was 
negotiated.36
After approving several of these transactions in the late 1980s, the IRS 
undertook a review of these arrangements culminating in a General 
Counsel’s Memorandum issued in 1991 that completely reversed the IRS’s 
 35. For a general overview of the revenue-stream, joint-venture transactions, see HYATT & 
HOPKINS, supra note 14, at 82–83; MANCINO, supra note 14, at ¶ 19.04[3]. 
 36. Because the going venture had purchased the “old” revenue stream at fair market value, the 
only scenario in which the venture would be profitable would be for the post-sale revenues to exceed 
the purchase price of the “old” revenue stream. In this scenario, the net profit above what the joint 
venture had to pay for the “old” revenue stream would be shared according to the terms of the joint 
venture. In one of the transactions reviewed, for example, the hospital retained 51% of the ownership 
of the joint venture, with 49% being offered for sale to individual medical staff. See MANCINO, supra 
note 14, at ¶ 19.04[3]. 
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position.37 While the General Counsel’s Memorandum opined that these 
arrangements violated both the private inurement and private-benefit 
proscriptions of tax exemption,38 one of the most interesting aspects of the 
Memorandum is its suggestion that certain kinds of joint-venture 
arrangements between doctors and hospitals would still pass exemption 
muster. These joint ventures included those that would establish a new 
health care provider, service or resource made available to the community, 
or that would measurably improve service levels or quality of service 
provided to the community.39 In other words, joint ventures that were 
based upon expanding access to health services would still be approved; 
joint ventures that did nothing but realign the economic incentives and 
sharing for existing services, however, would not be approved. 
A similar access-based theme occurred in court cases dealing with the 
application of the unrelated business income tax (“UBIT”) to certain 
health services provided by hospitals. Though the general position of the 
IRS has been that the UBIT applies to certain health services (such as 
pharmaceutical sales or diagnostic tests) provided by a hospital to the non-
patient general public,40 the IRS later recognized that when the hospital 
was the sole provider of such services in a geographic area the UBIT 
 37. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).  
 38. One of the requirements of exempt status stated in § 501(c)(3) is that “no part of the earnings 
[of the organization] inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.” I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) 
(2000). The “no inurement” prohibition has been interpreted to mean that an exempt organization 
cannot “siphon off” the economic benefits of exemption to insiders by, for example, paying excessive 
salaries or providing below-market loans to such insiders. See FRANCES R. HILL & DOUGLAS M. 
MANCINO, TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS ¶ 4.03 (2002); United Cancer Council v. Comm’r, 
165 F.3d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1999). The private-benefit limitation is more complex; at common law it 
referred to the fact that a “charity” must serve a large charitable class, not a single individual or even 
an identifiable small group of individuals. Recent IRS interpretations of private benefit, however, have 
expanded the doctrine beyond its common law roots into a broad limitation on how much benefit an 
exempt organization can confer on a small, identifiable group of individuals even if those individuals 
are not “insiders” and even if the benefits arguably are at arms length. Thus the issue of private benefit 
often arises in joint-venture arrangements between a hospital and a group of doctors, for example. See 
generally HYATT & HOPKINS, supra note 14, at 84–86; MANCINO, supra note 14, at 19–18 to 19–19; 
John D. Colombo, Private Benefit, Joint Ventures, and the Death of Healthcare as an Exempt 
Purpose, 34 J. HEALTH L. 505 (2001).  
 39. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1992) (“We recognize that there may well be legitimate 
purposes for joint ventures, whether analyzed under the anti-kickback statute or the Tax Code. These 
may include raising needed capital; bringing new services or a new provider to a hospital’s 
community; sharing the risk inherent in a new activity, or pooling diverse areas of expertise.”); See 
generally HILL & MANCINO, supra note 38, at ¶ 29.04[3][c]; Colombo, supra note 26, at 230. 
 40. Rev. Rul. 68-374, 1968-2 C.B. 242. See Carle Found. v. United States, 611 F.2d 1192 (7th 
Cir. 1979) (upholding IRS determination that pharmacy sales by Carle Hospital to general public 
constituted unrelated income). See generally HYATT & HOPKINS, supra note 14, at 447–52; MANCINO, 
supra note 14, at 15–33 to 15–40. 
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would not apply.41 The UBIT is designed to tax business income from an 
exempt entity when the income results from an activity unrelated to the 
entity’s charitable purpose. Therefore, the recognition by the courts and 
IRS that the UBIT will not apply when a hospital is providing services 
otherwise unavailable to the general public is an acknowledgement of the 
charitable nature of providing such services in those circumstances, and is 
further support for the notion that enhancing access is a major component 
of exemption analysis.  
A final major ruling by the IRS in the health care arena that appears to 
incorporate access concerns physician recruitment by hospitals and other 
exempt providers. Physician recruitment incentives such as free office 
space, payments for malpractice insurance coverage, and so forth, have 
long been exemption problems.42 Viewed in isolation, these incentives 
could violate the proscription in § 501(c)(3) that “no part of the net 
earnings [of an exempt organization] . . . [may] inure to the benefit of any 
private individual or shareholder”43—that is, recruitment incentives could 
be viewed as improperly “siphoning off” the economic benefits of 
exemption to a private party instead of dedicating those benefits to a broad 
charitable class.44
After some twenty-five years of sporadic consideration of physician 
recruitment, the IRS addressed the issue comprehensively in Rev. Rul. 97-
21.45 The ruling considered five different recruitment cases; four of these 
were considered consistent with exempt status. While the details of the 
four approved situations differed in many respects, all four carried one 
common element: the recruiting hospital demonstrated a need to recruit the 
physician in order to provide previously-unavailable services to the 
community, or to maintain the quality of existing services. Thus in 
Situation 1, a community hospital in a rural area with no other hospitals 
recruited a doctor to establish an OB/GYN practice in the geographic area 
where none existed. In Situation 2, an inner-city hospital recruited a doctor 
to establish a private pediatrics practice in the area. In Situation 3, an 
 41. Rev. Rul. 85-110, 1985-2 C.B. 166 (indicating that laboratory testing services performed for 
non-patients ordinarily would be subject to UBIT, but UBIT would not apply “if other laboratories are 
not available within a reasonable distance from the area served by the hospital or are clearly unable or 
inadequate to conduct tests needed by nonpatients.”). 
 42. For a general discussion of physician recruitment tools and an historical overview of the 
IRS’s positions on physician recruitment, see HYATT & HOPKINS, supra note 14, at 490–99; 
MANCINO, supra note 14, at ¶ 20.03. 
 43. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). 
 44. See generally HYATT & HOPKINS, supra note 14, at 485–90; MANCINO, supra note 14, 
§ 20.02[3]. 
 45. Rev. Rul. 97-21, 1997-1 C.B. 121. 
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inner-city hospital offered incentives to a doctor already on staff to expand 
an existing obstetrics practice to treat more Medicaid and indigent 
patients. In Situation 4, a private hospital in a metropolitan area recruited a 
diagnostic radiologist in order to provide adequate service coverage and 
quality for its radiology department. In short, all four of the situations in 
which the IRS approved recruitment incentives keyed on access to services 
as a major exemption criterion. 
C. Mixed Signals on Access: Federation Pharmacy Services and the HMO 
Cases 
While the above analysis indicates that most of the major IRS rulings 
in the health care sector carry heavy overtones of access as the primary 
criterion for judging exempt status, at least one health care precedent 
arguably contradicts an access-based model, and IRS litigating positions 
on HMO exemption appear to both support and contradict an access test. 
With respect to the former, in Federation Pharmacy Services, Inc. v. 
Commissioner,46 the IRS denied exemption to a pharmacy that sold drugs 
and medical supplies to the poor and elderly at cost. The IRS’s view, 
affirmed by the Eighth Circuit, was that a pharmacy was an inherently 
commercial enterprise and therefore could not be “charitable.”47 The 
Eighth Circuit also focused on the fact that the pharmacy did not offer free 
drugs to the poor or sell below cost to deserving populations—that is, the 
pharmacy in question was not giving away any services.48 But this analysis 
obviously contradicts Rev. Rul. 69-545 and the analysis of exemption for 
hospitals: nonprofit hospitals are also “inherently commercial” in the sense 
that their primary purpose is to provide health services for a fee and that 
their overall operations are designed to produce a financial surplus. More 
importantly for the thesis of this Article, one could certainly argue that the 
whole purpose of Federation Pharmacy Services was to increase access to 
 46. Fed’n Pharmacy Services, Inc. v. Comm’r, 625 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1980), aff’g, 72 T.C. 687 
(1979).  
 47. Fed’n Pharmacy Services, Inc. v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 687, 690 (1980). The Tax Court 
explained the Commissioner’s position: 
In this respect, respondent’s [IRS] ruling states in pertinent part: “The sale of prescription 
drugs to senior citizens and handicapped persons is a trade or business normally carried on for 
profit. Sales of prescription drugs to the elderly and the handicapped even at a discount is not, 
without more, in furtherance of a charitable purpose.” 
Id. 
 48. Fed’n Pharmacy Services, 625 F.2d at 807 (“An organization which does not extend some of 
its benefits to individuals financially unable to make the required payments reflects a commercial 
activity rather than a charitable one.”). 
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pharmaceuticals and medical equipment for a population (the poor and 
elderly) that historically has had insufficient access to health care. The 
record in the case, for example, showed that the organization had been 
formed by a senior-citizens organization in Minneapolis-St. Paul only after 
arrangements with for-profit pharmacies to offer drugs at a substantial 
discount to the elderly fell through.49 Accordingly, the result in Federation 
Pharmacy appears to be generally at odds with an access-oriented test of 
exemption. 
The IRS positions and court opinions on the exempt status of HMOs, 
on the other hand, illustrate both sides of access-as-an-exemption criterion. 
Though an early case had held that a staff-model HMO that provided 
services similar to a general-acute-care hospital would be tax exempt, the 
IRS continued to litigate exempt status for “contract-model” HMO’s.50 In 
the early 1990s, for example, the IRS challenged the exempt status of 
Geisinger Health Plan (“GHP”)51 an HMO formed by a large integrated 
delivery system (the Geisinger System) to enhance health care delivery to 
its service area, mostly rural north-eastern and north-central 
Pennsylvania.52 Although GHP had an open enrollment policy, at the time 
of the litigation GHP did not enroll any Medicaid recipients because it had 
not yet negotiated the necessary contracts with the Pennsylvania 
Department of Public Welfare.53 GHP also had adopted a subsidized dues 
 49. Id. at 805; accord 72 T.C. at 700 (Tietjens, J., dissenting). For further analysis of the 
Federation Pharmacy case under an access-based test, see infra text accompanying notes 125–30. 
 50. Sound Health Ass’n v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 158 (1978). I use the phrase “contract model” to 
refer to a structure in which the HMO does not actually employ health care professionals like doctors 
directly or own health care facilities; instead, the HMO contracts with doctors and hospitals to provide 
these services to its members. Other commentators have referred to this model as an “IPA” model, or, 
when contracts are executed with sibling members of an integrated network, a “group” model. See, 
e.g., HYATT & HOPKINS, supra note 14, at 185–92; BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 54 (2d 
ed. 2000). An HMO that does employ its own doctors and service professionals is often called a “staff” 
model. HYATT & HOPKINS, supra note 14, at 182. 
 51. The Geisinger litigation consisted of two major rounds. The initial challenge to tax-exempt 
status was rejected by the Tax Court in Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner (Geisinger I), 62 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1656 (1991). The IRS appealed this decision to the Third Circuit, which reversed the 
Tax Court on the exemption issue. Geisinger Health Plan v. Comm’r, 985 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1993). 
GHP, however, had argued in this initial round of litigation that if it failed exemption as a stand-alone 
entity, it nevertheless was entitled to exemption as an “integral part” of an exempt integrated health 
care system. This issue was remanded by the Third Circuit to the Tax Court, which held in the second 
round of litigation that GHP was not entitled to this derivative exemption. Geisinger Health Plan v. 
Comm’r (Geisinger II), 100 T.C. 394 (1993). The Tax Court’s opinion in Geisinger II was upheld by 
the Third Circuit on appeal. Geisinger Health Plan v. Comm’r, 30 F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 52. Geisinger I, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1656. 
 53. Id. at 1659–60. 
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program for indigent families in its service area, but had not implemented 
that program as of the date of litigation because of financial constraints.54
GHP’s argument for exemption was that it promoted health for the 
general benefit of the community pursuant to the test laid out in Rev. Rul. 
69-545. The IRS’s arguments, on the other hand, reflected broad access-
based themes. The IRS relied on two main points in attacking exemption 
for GHP. The first was that GHP improperly limited its membership to 
health patients who could afford its enrollment fees, citing the HMO’s 
lack of Medicaid service and virtual lack of charity care.55 Second, the IRS 
claimed that there was a significant difference between a “staff” model 
HMO, in which the provider actually employed health professionals and 
operated health care facilities, and a “contract” HMO (like GHP) in which 
the HMO did not operate any health facilities directly and all health 
services were provided by contracts with third parties.56 Both these 
positions fairly could be summarized as reflecting a conclusion that GHP 
did nothing to enhance access to health services beyond what was already 
available from other sources in the area: providing contractual health 
services for folks who can already pay for services does not enhance 
access by underserved groups, and providing services by contract with 
providers that already exist brings nothing new to the table in the way of 
expanded services. These positions, moreover, were upheld by the Third 
Circuit on appeal, which reversed the Tax Court’s earlier grant of 
exemption.57 Like the IRS, the Third Circuit appeared swayed by the fact 
that GHP brought little to the heath services table that did not already 
exist, particularly in the area of charity care and service to Medicaid 
patients.58
 54. Id. at 1660. 
 55. Geisinger, 985 F.2d at 1219. 
 56. Geisinger I, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1663. 
 57. Geisinger, 985 F.2d at 1210. 
 58. The Third Circuit stated: 
Viewed in this light, GHP standing alone does not merit tax-exempt status . . . GHP cannot 
say that it provides any health care services itself. Nor does it ensure that people who are not 
GHP subscribers have access to health care or information about health care . . . [I]t neither 
conducts research nor offers educational programs, much less educational programs open to 
the public. 
Id. at 1219. More recently, the Tax Court and Tenth Circuit upheld the IRS’s denial of exemption to 
HMOs operated as part of the Intermountain Health Care integrated system on similar grounds: 
In this case, we deal with organizations that do not provide health-care services directly. . . . 
Where, as here, “it is difficult to distinguish the plaintiff corporation from a mutual insurance 
company,” we must carefully scrutinize the organization’s operation. The fact that an activity 
is normally undertaken by commercial for-profit entities does not necessarily preclude tax 
exemption, particularly where the entity offers its services at or below-cost. But petitioners 
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Unfortunately, Geisinger also is a perfect illustration of why the failure 
to focus on access as an explicit exemption criterion creates some 
problems. Both the Tax Court and the Third Circuit noted in their opinions 
that GHP had been formed by the Geisinger System primarily to enhance 
access to medical services in areas that were underserved.59 Despite 
statistics in the Tax Court’s opinion showing that 23% of GHP’s 
subscribers resided in medically-underserved areas and 65% resided in 
counties containing medically-underserved areas,60 neither the IRS nor the 
Third Circuit paid much attention to this aspect of access as a case for 
exemption. Accordingly, while there are certainly access-based themes in 
the IRS positions in Geisinger, the failure to explicitly recognize access as 
an independent criterion that supports exemption meant that neither the 
IRS nor the courts seriously analyzed whether serving otherwise-
underserved populations constituted sufficient grounds for exemption. 
Nevertheless, the IRS has continued its attack on contract-model 
HMOs using virtually the same arguments as in Geisinger. The agency’s 
most recent success in IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Commissioner,61 
continued to reflect the themes that contract-model HMOs without 
significant charity-care programs failed to bring anything “extra” to the 
table in providing health services; and the Tenth Circuit, like the Third 
before it, has agreed with these points.62 Access themes, therefore, remain 
a key component of the analysis of exempt status for HMOs, though 
(again like the Third Circuit before it) the Tenth Circuit in IHC Health 
Plans failed to recognize access as an explicit exemption criterion. 
provide virtually no free or below-cost health-care services . . . Further, the fact that 
petitioners in no way subsidize dues for those who cannot afford subscribership distinguishes 
this case from the HMOs in Sound Health Ass’n v. C.I.R., 71 T.C. 158 (1979), and Geisinger 
I, 985 F.2d at 1219.  
IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 325 F.3d 1188, 1199–1200 (10th Cir. 2003) (citations and 
footnotes omitted).  
 59. Id. at 1212; Geisinger I, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1659. 
 60. Geisinger I, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1659. 
 61. IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 325 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 62. The IHC cases dealt with the exempt status of three HMO corporate subsidiaries of 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc. In each case, the IRS ruled that the subsidiaries were not exempt, and 
in each case the Tax Court agreed, citing particularly the fact that the HMOs in question did not 
provide free care or a subsidized dues program for the needy, provide free education programs, or do 
medical research. See, e.g., IHC Health Plans v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 593, 605 (2001); IHC 
Group, Inc. v. Comm’r 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 606, 615 (2001); IHC Care, Inc. v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 617, 625 (2001). On appeal, the 10th Circuit upheld the denial of exemption on essentially the 
same grounds: that the HMOs in question offered no charity care or subsidized dues programs, did not 
do significant medical research, nor offer free education programs. IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 
325 F.3d 1188, 1199–1203 (10th Cir. 2003). In short, the HMO’s really did nothing that might be 
considered as enhancing access to medical care in their community. 
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III. ACCESS IN OTHER EXEMPTION RULINGS 
While the cases and rulings in the health care arena present perhaps the 
strongest evidence of an unstated access criterion for exemption, issues of 
access also crop up in a number of other exemption areas. In this part, I 
examine IRS positions and cases in three areas in which, like health care 
organizations, the entities involved arguably perform services that are 
similar in scope to for-profit providers. Those three areas are arts 
organizations, such as community theaters or nonprofit art galleries; 
community-development organizations; and public-interest law firms. 
A. Arts Organizations 
Just as exempt nonprofit hospitals often co-exist in the same 
geographic market as for-profit competitors, exempt arts organizations 
often co-exist with for-profit firms that, at least on the surface, appear to 
provide similar services. Exempt nonprofit art galleries and community 
theaters often are found blocks (or feet) from for-profit galleries and 
theaters. Like their for-profit counterparts, moreover, nonprofit galleries 
often sell art and nonprofit theaters charge admission. Accordingly, unless 
we are prepared to accept the proposition that merely adopting nonprofit 
form is sufficient to justify tax exemption, we must find some core 
difference in operations to justify exemption for these entities. 
The traditional analysis employed by the IRS and courts in these cases 
has been to focus on whether the activities of the organization in question 
are imbued with a “commercial hue”; too much of this hue and the 
activities are no longer charitable, which results in a loss of exempt 
status.63 Like the community-benefit analysis employed in the health care 
field, the “commercial-hue” formulation provides little concrete guidance 
for deciding cases. For example, the Tax Court has emphasized the 
presence of substantial profits, use of commercial-pricing methods, and 
direct competition with for-profit firms as the key indicia of impermissible 
commercial hue;64 but the Third Circuit noted in a famous case that 
“success in terms of audience reached and influence exerted, in and of 
itself, should not jeopardize the tax-exempt status of organizations which 
remain true to their stated goals.”65
 63. See, e.g., Living Faith, Inc. v. Comm’r, 950 F.2d 365, 373–76 (7th Cir. 1991); Presbyterian 
& Reformed Publ’g v. Comm’r, 79 T.C. 1070, 1083 (1982), rev’d. 743 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1984).  
 64. Presbyterian & Reformed Publ’g v. Comm’r, 79 T.C. at 1083–85. 
 65. Presbyterian & Reformed Publ’g v. Comm’r, 743 F.2d at 158. 
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As with health care providers, however, a close reading of the actual 
analysis employed to decide the cases has a decidedly access-based flavor. 
In Goldsboro Art League v. Commissioner66 the IRS challenged the 
exempt status of a nonprofit organization that operated two public art 
galleries and made sales from each. The IRS argued that Goldsboro 
essentially did nothing different from a commercial art gallery and 
therefore was not entitled to exempt status. However, the Tax Court 
disagreed: 
In the instant case, since there are no other art museums or galleries 
in the area, petitioner has found difficulty attracting artists to exhibit 
their work without the incentive of the Art Gallery and Art Market. 
Petitioner has a jury to select which works will be displayed, and we 
find it significant that the works are chosen not for their salability 
but for their representation of modern trends. Exhibiting an artist’s 
more daring works in a part of the country where there are no 
nearby art museums or galleries illustrates that petitioner’s purpose 
is primarily to educate rather than to sell.67
In short, the Tax Court appeared to focus on the fact that the two art 
galleries provided increased access to art for the community on two fronts. 
First, since there were no other galleries in the community, the galleries 
played a critical role in providing access by the community to the works of 
artists. This observation tracks precedents in the health care area cited 
above in which the IRS and courts have held that providing a community 
with health services that previously were unavailable in the private market 
is a key factor in assessing exempt status for joint-venture transactions and 
in applying the UBIT.68 Second, the works exhibited were chosen as the 
best representations of their styles—that is, they were chosen on the basis 
of giving the public better access to particular artistic genres and not for 
commercial potential. 
These same access themes of providing the public access to artistic 
works that otherwise would not be available in the private market also 
surfaced in Plumstead Theater Society v. Commissioner,69 a decision most 
often cited for its analysis of the effects of joint-venture participations on 
exempt status. In Plumstead, the IRS argued that a nonprofit community 
theater’s decision to enter into a joint venture with for-profit investors to 
 66. Goldsboro Art League v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 337 (1980). 
 67. Id. at 344. 
 68. See supra text accompanying notes 37–41. 
 69. Plumstead Theater Soc’y v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1324 (1980). 
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fund a commercial play (First Monday in October) was inconsistent with 
exempt status. In rejecting the IRS’s challenge, the Tax Court again 
analyzed how exempt community theaters differed from their commercial 
counterparts, even though both charged admission: 
Commercial theaters . . . choose plays having the greatest mass 
audience appeal. Generally, they run the plays so long as they can 
attract a crowd . . . [and] do not encourage and instruct relatively 
unknown playwrights and actors. . . . Tax-exempt organizations . . . 
fulfill their artistic and community obligations by focusing on the 
highest possible standards of performance; . . . by developing new 
and original works; and by providing . . . opportunities for new 
talent. Thus, they keep the great classics of the theater alive and are 
willing to experiment with new forms of dramatic writing, acting, 
and staging.70
The court also noted that, unlike their commercial counterparts, 
community theaters “keep ticket prices at a level which is affordable to 
most of the community.”71
Like the analysis in Goldsboro, this summary of the essential 
differences between for-profit and exempt theaters focuses on issues of 
access. Admission prices are purposefully kept below costs in order to 
maximize the accessibility of the production to the community; the works 
performed, like the art displayed in Goldsboro, are chosen not for their 
commercial potential, but to give the community access to both the new 
and the old and expose the community to “new forms of writing, acting 
and staging” as well as new talent.72 In short, in each case the organization 
involved could claim on the facts that its mission was oriented toward 
providing increased community access to artistic works that otherwise 
would have been unavailable to the community—and not toward 
commercial exploitation of art. Although not couched specifically as an 
access-based test, the concepts explored by the Tax Court in both these 
cases support the “enhancing access” criterion as the touchstone of 
exemption. 
 70. Id. at 1332–33. 
 71. Id. at 1333. 
 72. Id. 
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B. Community-Development Organizations 
Another area of “commercial similarity” occurs with respect to 
organizations formed to foster community development or housing 
projects. Typical activities of the community-development organizations 
are providing capital to businesses willing to locate in low-income areas 
either through low-interest loans or the outright purchase of equity 
interests in the business.73 Housing projects typically involve the 
renovation or construction of housing resold to low and moderate income 
families at subsidized rates.74 As is the case with the other organizations 
discussed so far, these services have analogs in the commercial for-profit 
world. Making loans and arranging equity financing are usually the 
bailiwick of banks and investment bankers; housing projects are created 
by for-profit real estate developers. So how do these community-
redevelopment organizations differ from their commercial counterparts? 
Again, although the rulings do not specifically employ access analysis, 
enhancing access is the key criterion. In discussing exemption for a 
community-development organization, the IRS stressed in Rev. Rul. 74-
587 that the organization would loan funds and provide equity financing 
“to corporations or individual proprietors who are not able to obtain funds 
from conventional-commercial sources.”75 In that same ruling the IRS also 
noted that in dispensing funds, “[p]reference is given to businesses that 
will provide training and employment opportunities for the unemployed or 
under-employed residents of the area.”76 Both of these statements are 
access-oriented. Exemption is available to a community-development 
organization despite the commercial similarity of its services because 
those services are specifically directed at enhancing access—that is, 
providing access to monetary assistance for businesses that otherwise 
would not have access to those services or funds and providing access for 
members of the community to employment opportunities/training that 
otherwise would be unavailable. 
Similar themes underlie the housing development area. Although 
providing housing for the poor would qualify for exemption under 
traditional “relief of the poor” concepts, the IRS has extended exemption 
to organizations that provide moderate income housing under access-
 73. See Rev. Rul. 74-587, 1974-2 C.B. 162. 
 74. See Rev. Rul. 70-585, 1970-2 C.B. 115. 
 75. Rev. Rul. 74-587, 1974-2 C.B. 162. 
 76. Id. at 163. 
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oriented circumstances.77 Thus in Rev. Rul. 70-585, the IRS found that 
providing access to housing for moderate-income families who could not 
otherwise acquire it either because of racial discrimination or general 
community deterioration constituted qualifying exempt purposes.78
As with health care, however, the failure to focus on access as the 
central criterion of exemption results in some arguably contradictory 
results. For example, in the same housing ruling cited above, the IRS 
found that a group formed to provide moderate-income housing in a high-
income neighborhood for those who could not generally afford the high 
housing costs in that neighborhood would not be an exempt purpose.79 
That is, the ruling focused on the role of discrimination rather than the role 
of access in determining exempt status. As discussed below, had access 
been the controlling criterion for exemption, the result might well have 
been different. 
C. Public-Interest Law Firms 
Traditional “legal aid” services for the poor have long been recognized 
as tax-exempt because they limit their services to individuals who cannot 
afford legal representation.80 But the IRS has also granted exemption to 
“public-interest” law firms that do not serve the poor. In fact, many of the 
lawsuits brought by such law firms are “class actions in the public interest, 
suits for injunction against action by government[,] . . . similar 
representation before administrative boards and agencies, test suits where 
the private interest is small, and the like.”81 Similarly, in Revenue Ruling 
75-74 the IRS commented that “charitability rests not upon the particular 
positions advocated by the firm, but upon the provision of a facility for the 
resolution of issues of broad public importance.”82
As in the other cases examined above, the legal services provided by 
public-interest law firms have commercial counterparts. For-profit law 
firms often litigate major class-action suits that can be characterized as “in 
the public interest”—witness the class actions over asbestos exposure, the 
Dalkon Shield, and the recent tobacco litigation, just to name a few. But 
just as in the areas previously discussed, the factors used by the IRS in 
 77. Rev. Rul. 70-585, 1970-2 C.B. 115. 
 78. Id. at 116. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See Rev. Rul. 69-161, 1969-1 C.B. 149; see also Rev. Rul. 78-428, 1978-2 C.B. 177 
(amplifying Rev. Ru. 69-161). 
 81. Rev. Proc. 71-39, 1971-2 C.B. 575, 576. 
 82. Rev. Rul. 75-74, 1975-1 C.B. 152, 153. 
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determining exemption for public-interest law firms have a distinct access 
flavor. In further explaining its rationale for granting exempt status to 
public-interest law firms in Rev. Rul. 75-74 the IRS noted: 
It is generally recognized that public interest representation is not 
ordinarily provided on a continuing basis by private law firms . . . 
primarily due to the fact that this type of representation is not 
economically feasible for private firms. In the typical public interest 
case, no individual plaintiff has a sufficient economic interest to 
warrant his bearing the cost of retaining private counsel . . . this lack 
of economic feasibility in public interest cases is an essential 
characteristic distinguishing the work of public interest law firms 
from that of private firms and is a prerequisite of charitable 
recognition.83
The IRS requirement of a lack of economic feasibility for private 
litigants to pursue public-interest litigation is at its core an access-based 
concept. True, the access here is not for specific individuals to specific 
services (as in the cases of exempt health care organizations, exempt arts 
organizations or community-development organizations) but rather the 
ability for specific legal positions and ideas to have access to the court 
system. Without the public-interest-law-firm representation, these 
particular cases, and the positions they represent, would not have access to 
legal resolution. This is access of a qualitatively different kind, to be sure, 
but it is an access concept nonetheless. 
IV. THE POLICY CASE FOR ACCESS 
The above discussion illustrates that although IRS and court decisions 
do not specifically analyze exemption on the basis of enhancing access, 
this concept is in fact a central criterion in many of the decisions and 
rulings in these areas of commercial similarity. This part of the Article 
explores the policy case for making “enhancing access” the explicit main 
criterion of exemption in these cases. First, the Article examines how 
access fits with the major theoretical underpinnings of exemption and then 
the Article illustrates how making access the central exemption criterion 
would provide better “mission focus” for nonprofit entities seeking exempt 
status in areas of commercial similarity. 
 83. Id. at 153. 
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A. Access and the Theories of Tax Exemption 
Over the past two decades, scholars in both law and social sciences 
have isolated several possible theories for why charitable organizations are 
tax-exempt. While all of these theories have their unique aspects, they 
generally break into two very broad groups: the sociological/political 
theories and the economic theories.84 The main unifying theme of the 
sociological/political theories of exemption is that of pluralism. Thus 
under these theories, the justification for tax exemption ultimately lies in 
the fact that nonprofit entities enhance a pluralistic society by bringing to 
the table points of view and ways of doing things—a special “nonprofit 
ethic”—that otherwise would not exist. “America needs voluntary, 
nonprofit groups, not just because of what they do, but because of what 
 84. The two theories of exemption that do not fit quite as neatly into this dichotomy are the 
“relief of government burden,” or “quid pro quo” theory, and the Bittker/Rahdert tax-base theory. Both 
of these theories, however, have been fairly convincingly discredited as an effective explanation for 
exemption. The “relief of government burden” theory posits that exemption is granted to organizations 
that perform services that the government otherwise would have to perform in their absence. Thus, 
exemption is a rough “quid pro quo” to these organizations for relieving government from the 
necessity to do so (and presumably the necessity to collect tax revenues to do so). This theory, 
however, simply does not explain the scope of tax exemption. Religious institutions, for example, 
certainly cannot be characterized as “relieving a government burden” since the government is 
constitutionally prohibited from promoting religion. Traditional private schools might fit the “quid pro 
quo” theory since government-funded public schools presumably would incur the educational cost for 
students attending these private schools, but modern exemption rulings have extended exemption far 
beyond traditional public education to include zoos, planetariums, continuing legal education and other 
professional skills training programs, a jazz festival, and various counseling services that quite clearly 
are not within the realm of services one would expect the government to provide in the absence of the 
nonprofit sector. See generally COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 2, at 45–46, 230–31. 
 The Bittker/Rahdert tax-base theory opines that tax exemption for charitable organizations is the 
result of the inability of our taxing system to measure income for these organizations. Boris I. Bittker 
& George F. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 
YALE L.J. 299 (1976). For example, donations to charitable entities would not be income but rather 
gifts excluded from gross income under § 102 of the Internal Revenue Code. Similarly, program 
expenditures by charitable organizations might not be deductible under § 162 because an entity that 
does not seek to make a profit generally is not considered to be engaged in a trade or business—a 
requirement of the § 162 deduction. However, many (if not most) charitable organizations derive the 
bulk of their income from fees for services provided or goods sold; these “commercial” nonprofits (of 
which hospitals are a primary example) would have little trouble fitting into the traditional tax models. 
See generally COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 2, at 24–25. Even poor-relief charities could do so: 
“Tiffany’s net income available for distribution to its stockholders is arguably different from the Red 
Cross’s distributions of donations to flood victims, but the two could be made subject to tax with 
roughly equal convenience.” Rob Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for 
Charities: Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis, in RATIONALES FOR FEDERAL INCOME TAX EXEMPTION 
27 (1991) (consisting of a collection of papers prepared for the 1991 National Center on Philanthropy 
& the Law’s conference at New York University). 
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they are, because their very existence is a guarantee of the diversity that 
protects the freedom of all of us.”85  
The notion that tax exemption is a government subsidy (or at least a 
means of non-interference) for organizations that promote the values of a 
pluralistic society is reflected in a number of court opinions and both 
traditional and academic theories of exemption. In 1970, the Supreme 
Court in Walz v. Tax Commissioner stated, “[c]ertain entities that exist in a 
harmonious relationship to the community at large, and that foster its 
‘moral or mental improvement,’ should not be inhibited in their activities 
by property taxation.”86 In his concurrence in Bob Jones University v. 
United States, Justice Powell echoed the pluralism theme by criticizing the 
majority’s characterization of the rationale for exemption as too narrow:  
Even more troubling to me is the element of conformity that appears 
to inform the Court’s analysis. . . . In my opinion, such a view of 
§501(c)(3) ignores the important role played by tax exemptions in 
encouraging diverse, indeed often sharply conflicting, activities and 
viewpoints. As Justice Brennan has observed, private, nonprofit 
groups receive tax exemptions because “each group contributes to 
the diversity of association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a 
vigorous, pluralistic society.” Far from representing an effort to 
reinforce any perceived “common community conscience,” the 
provision of tax exemptions to nonprofit groups is one 
indispensable means of limiting the influence of governmental 
orthodoxy on important areas of community life.87
The pluralism rationale also surfaces in some academic theories that 
have been proposed to explain tax exemption. Peter Swords defended 
property-tax exemption on pluralistic grounds by recognizing “the 
 85. Nicholas P. Cafardi, The Third Sector, reprinted in NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI & JACLYN 
FABEAN CHERRY, TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 90, 92 (2003). 
Commentators as far back as Alexis DeTocqueville observed that voluntary associations were both 
endemic to and a unique feature of U.S. society. See 2 ALEXIS DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA 106–10 (P. Bradley ed., Alfred A. Knopf 1966) (1835). See also LESTER M. SALAMON, 
AMERICA’S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 14 (2d ed. 1999). Chauncey Belknap, writing on the 
history of tax exemption for the famous Filer Commission Reports, captured the pluralism rationale by 
noting that “government relieves from the tax burden religious, educational, and charitable activities 
because it wishes to encourage them as representing the highest and noblest achievements of 
mankind.” Chauncey Belknap, The Federal Income Tax Exemption of Charitable Organizations: Its 
History and Underlying Policy, in RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE 
PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS 2025, 2033–35 (U.S. Dept. of the Treasury ed., 1977). 
 86. Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664, 672–73 (1970). 
 87. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Justice 
Brennan’s concurrence in Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970)). 
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advantages of pluralism that flow from having a voluntary sector of 
charitable organizations.”88 Professor Rob Atkinson has opined that 
exemption is an appropriate way to recognize and encourage altruism in 
our society—a kind of “metabenefit” resulting from the nonprofit form 
that should be valued in its own right for its contribution to “what is 
ultimately good” in society.89 More recently, Evelyn Brody explained tax 
exemption as recognition of the role of a “third sovereign” (the nonprofit 
sector) in our society. Brody’s theory is that exemption is the federal and 
state government’s way of recognizing (within limits) the legitimacy of 
nonprofit organizations and not interfering with their day-to-day 
operations.90 Although Brody does not specifically ground her theory in 
the pluralism-enhancing function of nonprofits, the sovereignty 
perspective is consistent with recognizing the pluralistic contributions of 
charitable organizations. 
The economic theories, on the other hand, focus less on the end 
product—the role of nonprofits in enhancing pluralism—and more on the 
underlying reasons for the formation and existence of nonprofits. The 
common theme of these economic theories is that nonprofits form as a 
result of market failure: both the failure of private markets to produce 
certain goods and services demanded by a segment of the population and 
coincident failure of the government to provide these services through its 
taxing authority.91 When this twin failure occurs, nonprofit organizations 
step in to supply a desired service. Exemption for these entities is justified 
in a number of ways. Henry Hansmann explained exemption as a method 
to help nonprofit organizations with capital formation, since nonprofits 
cannot by definition access the public-equity-capital markets.92 Nina 
Crimm takes the position that exemption compensates nonprofits for 
undertaking entrepreneurial risk, which in the private market ordinarily 
would be compensated by return-on-investment.93 Exemption provides a 
 88. PETER SWORDS, CHARITABLE REAL PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS IN NEW YORK STATE 18 
(1981). 
 89. Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 628–30 (1990). 
 90. Evelyn Brody, Legal Theories of Tax Exemption: A Sovereignty Perspective, in PROPERTY 
TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES 145, 146 (Evelyn Brody ed., 2002). See also Evelyn Brody, Of 
Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585 (1998). 
 91. See, e.g., SALAMON, supra note 85, at 11–13; John D. Colombo, The Marketing of 
Philanthropy and the Charitable Contributions Deduction: Integrating Theories for Deduction and 
Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657, 696–98 (2001). The classic explanation of the market 
failure hypothesis is in Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980). 
 92. Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Federal 
Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981). 
 93. Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable 
Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419, 452–54 (1998). 
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sort of “floor” economic return for organizations providing public goods 
that otherwise could not hope to make the normal entrepreneurial 
economic return.94 Mark Hall and I suggested that exemption is necessary 
to overcome the chronic underfunding of nonprofit organizations that 
results from individuals free-riding on services provided by nonprofits to 
their charitable beneficiaries.95 All three of these theories, however, share 
the common theme that exemption is a method of providing financial 
resources to overcome the twin failures that cause nonprofit organizations 
to step in to fill the service gaps. 
The most interesting aspect of a doctrinal test for exemption based 
upon “enhancing access” is that the access criterion appears to bridge 
these two broad theoretical categories. Take health care organizations, for 
example, and assume that exemption required these organizations to prove 
that they substantially enhanced access to medical services either by 
providing services to previously-underserved segments of a community or 
else by providing the general community with specific services that 
otherwise were unavailable. In either of these situations, the organization 
meets the pluralism explanation of exemption: the organization in question 
has brought to the table new services and ways of delivering services that 
did not exist before, the essence of the pluralistic view of exemption. At 
the same time, the access criterion meets the economic explanations of 
exemption. By tying exemption to expansion of services to groups that 
otherwise were underserved, or to providing services otherwise 
unavailable to the general public, the organization has stepped in to cover 
a twin failure since the services were not previously provided either by the 
government or by the private market. 
This same analysis could be applied to the other kinds of “commercial 
similarity” cases analyzed above. For example, limiting exemption to arts 
organizations that can prove they are enhancing access satisfies the 
pluralism criterion by requiring an organization to somehow present an 
artistic viewpoint to groups that currently do not have access to that 
viewpoint. At the same time, these groups could be said to suffer from a 
twin failure in that neither the private market nor the government is 
providing access to that artistic viewpoint for them. Hence, using 
“enhancing access” as the chief criterion to award tax exemption in these 
cases furthers the pluralistic ideal and at the same time satisfies the 
economic explanations for the exemption. 
 94. Id. at 462. 
 95. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 2, at 100–13. 
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B. Using Access to Focus Charitable Mission 
A second benefit of an access-based test for exemption in commercial-
similarity cases comes in the form of what I will refer to as “mission 
focus.” One significant problem with nonprofit organizations engaging in 
commercial activity or providing commercial-like services is the 
“diversion” problem. As nonprofit managers become more involved with 
commercial or commercial-like services, a danger exists that the core 
values of “altruism, pluralism and community”96 will erode, and that 
managers of charitable enterprises will become “equally likely as for-
profit managers to cheat the consumer or donor with respect to output 
characteristics that are not readily observable. In effect, true nonprofits 
may be turned into ‘for-profits in disguise’ as a result of the managerial 
selection process.”97 Another similar take on this problem is that nonprofit 
managers will become “empire builders” focused more on competing with 
for-profit counterparts than on delivering charitable services. 
“Management’s sense of identity and focus shifts when [commercial] 
activities are present . . . because of the irresistible attractions of 
empirebuilding.”98
Evidence of this “mission failure” already exists. Professor Burton 
Weisbrod noted that the reorganization of the National Geographic Society 
in the late 1990s may have resulted in greater emphasis on profitable 
activities such as cable television partnerships and documentary films at 
the expense of field research.99 The health care arena, however, may 
provide the best example of this mission failure. As the Introduction to this 
Article indicated, empirical studies generally find few differences between 
the services provided by nonprofit and for-profit entities—including few 
differences in uncompensated care rates or quality of care.100 The reasons 
for this convergence are not difficult to understand. Since the early 1980s 
both private insurers and the government under Medicare and Medicaid 
have squeezed reimbursement rates for services to virtually eliminate the 
possibility that hospitals and other health care providers could use profits 
generated by reimbursements to these covered patients to subsidize 
 96. Janne Gallagher, Peddling Products: The Need to Limit Commercial Behavior by Nonprofit 
Organizations, 12 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 1007, 1014 (1995). 
 97. Estelle James, Commercialism Among Nonprofits: Objectives, Opportunities and 
Constraints, in TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT, supra note 5, at 271, 281. 
 98. Ellen P. Aprill, Lessons from the UBIT Debate, 45 TAX NOTES 1105, 1108 (1989). 
 99. Burton A. Weisbrod, Conclusions and Public-Policy Issues: Commercialism and the Road 
Ahead, in TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT, supra note 5, at 288, 294. 
 100. See supra text accompanying notes 5–6. 
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services to the uninsured.101 As a result, both nonprofit and for-profit 
hospitals have undertaken similar strategies to control costs and entice 
paying patients to their facilities.102
At the same time, the community-benefit formulation of tax exemption 
under Rev. Rul. 69-545 provided virtually no incentive for exempt health 
care providers to implement specific, identifiable mission-based 
differences in services to distinguish themselves from for-profit 
counterparts.103 The problem of identifying specific “community benefits” 
became so severe that supporters of the nonprofit, exempt hospital 
industry published a number of articles in the early 1990s warning of the 
need to quantify these other community benefits to preserve exemption, 
and trade associations such as the Voluntary Hospitals of America and the 
Catholic Health Association developed detailed community-benefit 
assessment and reporting programs.104 As noted in Part II, above, under 
Rev. Rul. 69-545 the touchstone of exemption was providing health care 
services to a broad cross-section of the community—accepting all paying 
patients, even if indigent patients were excluded. This, of course, is 
exactly what for-profit hospitals and other providers do.105 Moreover, 
 101. See Bloche, supra note 5, at 356–57; Sloan, supra note 5, at 159–60, 162 (noting that 
whatever the ability of hospitals to cost-shift in the past, this ability would be seriously limited in the 
future; “[c]hanges in hospital payment, increased competition, and cuts in the growth of public budgets 
will reduce provision of [charity] care by all types of hospitals. . . .”). 
 102. See, e.g., David Shactman & Stuart Altman, The Conversion of Hospitals from Not-for-profit 
to For-profit Status, Council on the Economic Impact of Health System Change 18–26 (1996), 
available at http://sihp.brandeis.edu/council/ (last viewed Sept. 1, 2004) (“NFP [not-for-profit] 
hospitals have been forced to act more like their FP counterparts by responding to increased cost and 
price pressures of managed care purchasers and to stringent financial requirements of capital 
markets.”); see also Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, Market Forces, Diversification of Activity 
and the Mission of Not-for-Profit Hospitals, in THE CHANGING HOSPITAL INDUSTRY 195 (David S. 
Cutler ed., 2000) (detailing nonprofit hospitals’ diversification trends in response to financial 
pressure). 
 103. See David A. Hyman, The Conundrum of Charitability: Reassessing Tax Exemption for 
Hospitals, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 327, 375 (1990) (“However, community benefit is a nebulous concept 
because it involves many intangible elements . . . . Even the most vigorous proponents of community 
benefit are unable to develop anything more than a thirty-two page checklist which provides no way to 
judge which factors are most important, or how many positive response are needed. . . .”). 
 104. Bloche, supra note 5, at 384 nn.320–22 and sources cited therein. David Seay and Bruce 
Vladeck have commented: 
To some extent . . . the malaise exhibited towards nonprofit health care institutions has 
appeared in the institutions themselves. . . . This paper identifies a rationale—indeed a series 
of rationales—for the special role of voluntary, not-for-profit health care institutions.  
 . . . That every single voluntary institution is not living up to these ideals, however, is 
obvious. 
J. DAVID SEAY & BRUCE C. VLADECK, UNITED HOSP. FUND OF N.Y., MISSION MATTERS 8 (1987). 
 105. See Hyman, supra note 103, at 376 (“How then does nonprofit Hospital A [in Rev. Rul. 69-
545] differ from the for-profit hospital down the street that does the same thing?”). 
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many services that nonprofit hospitals pointed to as “community benefits” 
had commercial potential: outreach programs, for example, such as 
community education and health screening “may serve marketing and 
other promotional purposes for hospitals, just as sponsorship of sporting 
events or the arts does for many for-profit corporations.”106
In fact, as Part II notes, the resulting inability of the IRS to distinguish 
exempt health care providers from non-exempt ones under the general 
holding of Rev. Rul. 69-545 is what gradually led the IRS to require other 
indicia of “charitableness” when dealing with health care providers other 
than traditional acute-care hospitals, such as requiring a minimum level of 
charity care in the early IDS rulings107 and stressing the lack of charity 
care in the litigated HMO cases.108 The resulting test, however, became an 
amorphous “health services plus” test that required a health care provider 
seeking exemption to show that it did more than simply provide health 
care services to paying patients, but failed to define the “more” in any 
meaningful way.109
Adopting a test that focused on access, however, would give health 
care providers and other nonprofit providers of commercially-similar 
services a well-defined target for delineating mission-based services that 
distinguish the nonprofit from their for-profit counterparts. Testing 
exemption against an access criterion obviously would encourage 
nonprofit providers to focus their mission on providing services to 
previously-underserved populations or bringing previously-unavailable 
 106. Bloche, supra note 5, at 385.  
 107. See supra text accompanying notes 32–34. 
 108. See supra text accompanying notes 50–61. 
 109. The Tenth Circuit’s recent statement in the IHC Health Plans decision perfectly captures the 
uncertain nature of the current test for exempting health care providers. In analyzing the current test 
for exemption, the court noted: 
Although providing health-care products or services to all in the community is necessary 
under those rulings, it is insufficient, standing alone, to qualify for tax exemption under 
section 501(c)(3). Rather, the organization must provide some additional “plus.” This plus is 
perhaps best characterized as “a benefit which the society or the community may not itself 
choose or be able to provide, or which supplements and advances the work of public 
institutions already supported by tax revenues.” Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 591. 
Concerning the former, the IRS rulings provide a number of examples: providing free or 
below-cost services, see Rev. Rul. 56-185; maintaining an emergency room open to all, 
regardless of ability to pay, see Rev. Rul. 69-545; and devoting surpluses to research, 
education, and medical training, see Rev. Rul. 83-157. 
IHC Health Plans, 325 F.3d at 1197–98. In short, the Tenth Circuit recognized that in order to be 
exempt a health care provider must demonstrate some significant difference in its mission-related 
services from for-profit counterparts, but found a number of possible items that could fulfill this 
requirement. An access-based test, on the other hand, would define the “plus” far more precisely as set 
forth in Part V, below. 
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services to the general population, thus differentiating them from for-profit 
firms providing similar services. Providing such a mission-specific target 
would go a long way towards combating the possibility that nonprofit 
providers of commercial-like services will become “for-profits in 
disguise” as their services become ever-more indistinguishable from for-
profit counterparts. 
V. THE PRACTICALITIES: DOCTRINE AND RESULTS 
A. Forming a Doctrinal Test of “Enhancing Access” 
So far, this Article has laid out the legal and theoretical case for having 
the IRS formally adopt “enhancing access” as the central criterion for 
granting exemption in “commercial-similarity” cases. The legal case is 
based on the argument that access already is the major criterion in 
exemption decisions in these cases; the IRS simply has not formally 
recognized it as such. The theoretical case is that an access test bridges the 
two main theoretical explanations for exemption: the sociological 
explanation of promoting pluralism and the economic explanation of 
addressing market failure. The final piece of the argument for adopting an 
access-based test for exemption is to describe the specific doctrinal criteria 
that would govern exemption under this approach. 
The basic doctrinal test already has been set forth in the discussion in 
Parts II and III, above. Drawing from the decisions outlined in those parts, 
an access-based test would require an entity seeking exemption to show 
that it enhances access either by providing general services (of a type that 
may be virtually indistinguishable from services provided by for-profit 
providers) to previously-underserved populations or by showing that it 
provides services to the general population that were not previously 
provided by for-profit entities. To again use the health care world as an 
example, an HMO might seek exemption by bringing general-health 
services to areas that previously were medically underserved. These 
services might not look any different from the range of services provided 
by for-profit HMOs to different populations, but the population served 
would be different. On the other hand, a specialty-cancer treatment 
hospital might seek exemption on the basis that it provides unique services 
to the general population that were otherwise unavailable from for-profit 
providers. 
The objective indicia needed to establish exemption under this broad 
test fall into two general categories. The first category would be process-
based factors. For example, consistent with the observation in Part IV, that 
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an access-based test can help focus a nonprofit’s mission and avoid the 
slide into a “for-profit in disguise,” an entity seeking exemption should 
have a specific, board-approved, written mission-based plan for how it 
will enhance access. This plan should spell-out what market or service the 
nonprofit seeks to provide that the private market has failed to address, 
and provide specific implementation plans and benchmarks for addressing 
this access failure. Other process-based factors might include a governing 
board that is representative of the general community110 or regular 
meetings with community leaders to engage the community regarding its 
access needs. 
I would not let process alone carry the analysis, however. At the end of 
the day an entity seeking exemption should be required to demonstrate that 
its processes have actually produced results. Accordingly, the second 
broad category would involve outputs measurements. As the Tenth Circuit 
noted recently, quantification is an ever-present problem,111 but an 
appropriate test must identify in some quantifiable way how well the entity 
is executing its access mission in order to gain exempt status.  
I suggest that this outputs side of the equation has two basic 
components. The first, which ought to be obvious (but is often overlooked 
in the community-benefit test currently applied to health-care providers), 
is that the organization claiming exempt status must prove that it is doing 
more to enhance access than its for-profit counterparts do. If a hospital or 
HMO claiming exemption does so on the basis of providing enhanced 
access via services to the poor, then as a minimum baseline it must show 
that it provides substantially more of such services than for-profits do—
that is, that its uncompensated-care rate is significantly higher than rates 
for similarly-situated for-profit providers.112 Alternatively, one might be 
 110. In fact, a community board is already a virtual requirement of exemption in commercial 
similarity cases, particularly in health services. See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117, discussed 
supra notes 17–25. 
 111. IHC Health Plans, 325 F.3d at 1198. 
 112. I have used “uncompensated care” rather than the more amorphous “charity care” in this 
sentence for a specific reason, which helps demonstrate the point in the text. All health-care providers 
have some non-paying patients. For-profit firms generally refer to these non-paying patients as bad-
debt cases, while nonprofits tend to want to classify them as charity care—regardless whether they 
attempt collection proceedings or not. For this reason, total “uncompensated care” is the measure used 
in modern-empirical studies to compare nonprofit and for-profit providers. See, e.g., Sloan, supra note 
5, at 161–62 (using “uncompensated care” as the relevant measure). Even using this measure, of 
course, one can argue that a nonprofit may still not be doing enough to “earn” exemption. For 
example, if a for-profit organization provides $1 million in uncompensated care and also pays $3 
million annually in taxes, while a nonprofit provides $1.5 million in uncompensated care but pays no 
taxes, one might claim that the nonprofit is still $2.5 million “better off” than the for-profit after 
having escaped the tax burden. In such a case, one might also claim that the community would be 
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able to show that particular nonprofit hospitals offer a different mix of 
services than for-profit counterparts that target otherwise-underserved 
populations. For example, in a recent article Professor Jill Horwitz 
claimed that an empirical study of nonprofit, for-profit, and government 
hospitals demonstrated that nonprofit hospitals generally provided more 
unprofitable services than similar for-profit hospitals (though less than 
similar government-owned hospitals).113 If true, this would be a strong 
basis for claiming exemption under the proposed-access test. Similarly, if 
a nonprofit art gallery claims exemption on the basis of bringing styles of 
art to the public that it otherwise generally would not have access to, the 
gallery better be able to prove that the for-profit competitor down the 
street does not show and sell similar artistic genres. 
Second, the entity seeking exemption must demonstrate that a 
substantial portion of its resources are being used to implement its access-
enhancing mission. In many cases this factor would be obvious: a 
community theater that produced only plays unavailable from commercial 
counterparts is using 100% of its resources on its access-based mission; 
ditto for an HMO that serves only underserved populations. But other 
cases might require more analysis. If the community theater does 
productions of Phantom of the Opera and Our Town along with its 
obscure artistic productions, it needs to be able to show that revenues from 
the commercial productions are being used to cross-subsidize the rest of its 
program.  
Of course, the final question in both these recommendations is defining 
what “substantial” means. Is it “substantial” if a nonprofit hospital 
provides 10% more uncompensated care than a for-profit competitor? Is it 
substantial if a community theater devotes 10% of its resources to obscure 
artistic productions while using the other 90% to reproduce Rodgers & 
Hammerstein musicals? The answer to these questions probably should 
better off collecting the tax dollars and redistributing them to the poor so that they could purchase 
services from the for-profit providers. See Hyman, supra note 103, at 361 (“In fact, one underestimates 
the contribution of for-profits if the sole benchmark is a comparison of charity care.”); see also Gary 
Claxton et al., Public Policy Issues in Nonprofit Conversions: An Overview, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Mar.–
Apr. 1997, at 9, 18 (“[I]f taxes paid by for-profit hospitals are counted as community benefits, . . . the 
benefits provided by for-profit hospitals would exceed those of nonprofits.”). But this scenario 
assumes that the government would, in fact, redistribute the tax dollars collected in this way; 
remember that the access-based test starts by requiring the nonprofit to provide general services to 
populations not currently receiving access from either the private sector or the government, or specific 
services not being provided by the private sector or government. Hence the starting point for the 
access-based test is that government is not addressing the access issues and—because of the vagaries 
of majoritarian politics—may never do so. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 2, at 107–08. 
 113. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 1367. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p343 Colombo book pages.doc12/22/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
374 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:343 
 
 
 
 
 
 
begin with the observation that neither the courts nor the IRS have been 
willing to adopt a mechanical-numerical test to determine when an 
organization engaged in commercial activity has a primary purpose that is 
charitable. As early as 1964 the IRS concluded that while a comparison of 
expenditures on charitable activities versus business activities was 
certainly relevant to the primary purpose test, an entity would only meet 
the test if, after considering such expenditures, “an organization is shown 
in fact to be carrying on a real and substantial charitable program 
commensurate in financial scope with its financial resources and its 
income from business activities and other sources.”114 The test of primary 
purpose is “a test of whether there is a real, bona fide or genuine charitable 
purpose . . . and not a mathematical measuring . . . .”115 A more recent 
exposition of this balancing approach is in the Tenth Circuit’s recent IHC 
Health Plans decision. Relying on the Treasury Regulations’ admonition 
that an exempt organization must be engaged “primarily” in charitable 
activities, the court opined that the community benefit provided by the 
exempt organization cannot be merely “incidental”; rather, it must be of 
“sufficient magnitude” that one can fairly infer that the primary purpose of 
the organization is dedicated to the charitable mission.116  
If one adapts the language of the IRS and courts cited above to an 
access-based test, one might formulate the test as follows: in order to be 
exempt, the organization must create a factual record of outputs to show 
that access issues are a bona fide primary goal of the organization and not 
simply a de minimis “sideshow” or after-effect of pursuing a commercial 
enterprise. This obviously would involve some kind of numerical 
comparisons with for-profit providers to demonstrate the significance of 
the outputs, including the revenues dedicated to the access mission, the 
number of employees/staff involved in executing the access mission, and 
even the number of services provided or individuals served—but would 
not use a “magic number” like 51% to identify the line at which access 
efforts become “substantial.” 
 114. Gen. Couns. Mem. 32,689 (Oct. 9, 1963) (quoting the Exempt Organization Council’s 
analysis, attached as an appendix to Gen. Couns. Mem. 32,689). 
 115. Id.  
 116. IHC Health Plans, 325 F.3d at 1198 (“[T]he existence of some incidental community benefit 
is insufficient. Rather, the magnitude of the community benefit conferred must be sufficient to give 
rise to a strong inference that the organization operates primarily for the purpose of benefiting the 
community.”) (emphasis omitted). 
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B. The Results of an Access-Based Test  
1. Health Care 
As detailed above,117 since 1969 the IRS purportedly has followed the 
“community-benefit” standard of exemption enunciated in Rev. Rul. 69-
545. But the community-benefit standard’s greatest weakness is that it 
does not provide any outputs-based method for judging when a provider 
should be exempt. If exemption is based on providing health care for the 
general benefit of the community, and if the services provided by for-
profit and nonprofits are similar, pricing structures are similar, and 
uncompensated care rates are similar, what distinguishes a provider that 
deserves tax exemption from one that does not? How can one follow a 
standard that emphasizes providing health care “for the general benefit of 
the community” and then try to draw lines between contract-model and 
staff-model HMOs when both provide similar services at similar rates to 
the general public?  
An access-based standard might well provide the key. As Part II 
illustrates, the IRS and courts already have used access themes to make 
these distinctions. The main criteria of Rev. Rul. 69-545 (a community 
board, open staff policy, treatment of Medicaid patients, and an open 
emergency room) are certainly factors that would tend to support an 
access-based mission,118 and both the IRS and courts have continued to 
rely on charity care as a distinguishing characteristic of exempt health care 
providers despite the IRS’s official “dumping” of charity care as the basis 
for exemption in 1969.119
But while these informal access criteria are certainly helpful in 
examining exempt status (and would be part of the process side of the 
access test outlined above), adopting access as an explicit criterion of 
exemption would provide concrete guidance for difficult cases that the 
current community-benefit standard simply lacks. For example, an explicit 
focus on access might provide a structured way to distinguish between 
rural nonprofit hospitals and those in major metropolitan areas—even if 
their services were substantially similar and neither was providing much in 
the way of charity care. From an access standpoint, a nonprofit hospital 
serving a rural community might well have a credible case that without the 
financial benefits of exemption it would close its doors, thus shutting off 
 117. See supra text accompanying notes 14–25. 
 118. See supra text accompanying notes 20–25. 
 119. See supra text accompanying notes 35–62. 
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access for its service community.120 A similar nonprofit in a major 
metropolitan area served by for-profit providers might not have such a 
case;121 thus, the rural hospital would get exemption while the 
metropolitan one would not. 
Similarly, an access-based test would provide a rationale to distinguish 
between exempt HMOs and non-exempt ones and could provide an 
explanation for the IRS’s insistence that a contract-model HMO has less of 
a claim to exemption than a staff model. With respect to the baseline test 
for exemption, an HMO—like any other health service provider—would 
need to show that either it brings substantial new services to the 
community that previously were unavailable from for-profit providers or 
else that it serves a target population that otherwise was underserved. 
With respect to the contract-model versus staff-model debate, under the 
current community-benefit test any distinction in exempt status between 
these two models of HMOs is necessarily arbitrary. If the test for 
exemption really is a focus on providing health care to a broad cross-
section of the community, which is what Rev. Rul. 69-545 tells us, then 
both contract-model HMOs and staff models do this equally.122 If one 
focuses on access, however, then the distinction might make some sense. 
Since a contract-model HMO provides services wholly through contracts 
with existing providers, by definition a contract model HMO brings 
nothing new to the table in the way of access unless it targets services at a 
particular underserved population. On the other hand, one might argue that 
a staff-model HMO, which employs its own doctors and staff and operates 
its own facilities, does expand the access pie by creating a whole new 
provider system (and might also bring new services to the community by 
directly hiring new doctors to fill new service niches). This analysis in turn 
would be consistent with the IRS’s observations in General Counsel 
Memorandum 39,862 that joint-venture arrangements, which bring new 
services (expanded access) to a community or demonstrably improve the 
quality of care (and therefore improve existing access), are consistent with 
 120. This case obviously would have to be credible on the facts. Factors that might impact such an 
argument would include whether a for-profit firm had made inquiries regarding this specific market or 
had operations in similar markets; whether the rural hospital operates at a significant surplus or not; 
and, if it does not operate at a significant surplus, whether it regularly relies on donations or 
government grants to make up operating deficits. 
 121. Contrastly, Prof. Horwitz claims that nonprofit hospitals provide more unprofitable services 
likely to be needed by the poor and uninsured than for-profit counterparts. See Horwitz, supra note 5, 
at 1407. If true, this claim would support exemption under an access-based test. 
 122. See, e.g., IHC Health Plans, 325 F.3d at 1203–04 n.35 (“We recognize that when we 
consider petitioners standing alone, drawing a distinction between a ‘staff-model HMO’ (as in Sound 
Health) and a ‘contract HMO’ (as in Geisinger and here) may not make sense.”).  
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exempt status; while those that simply involve contractual rearrangements 
of existing services do not.123
Speaking of joint ventures, an access-based rationale could also help 
bring order to this area of chaos as well. Though I have serious doubts that 
the IRS’s fixation on, and special analysis of, joint-venture arrangements 
is justified under current law,124 an access-based test would at least bring 
some level of sanity to the area. In general, this test would simply follow 
the guidelines set forth in General Counsel Memorandum 39,862: joint 
ventures that bring new services to the population—or that are necessary 
to keep current service levels from eroding—further the purposes of 
exemption and provide grounds for exemption; those that simply rearrange 
the chairs on the deck to make seating arrangements more pleasurable do 
not. 
An access standard, however, will require the IRS to revise its views of 
exemption qualification in certain cases. Thus, even contract-model 
HMOs might qualify for exemption if they can make a credible case that 
they bring services to underserved areas or populations. Under an access-
based standard for exemption, for example, one might well conclude that 
Geisinger Health Plan should have been exempt because of this very 
rationale.125 Similarly, a pharmacy organized to provide services to the 
poor and elderly at cost almost certainly has a strong case that it enhances 
access for two chronically underserved populations; ergo, the IRS and 
court decisions in Federation Pharmacy Services might need to be 
reversed under an access test.126  
Federation provides a particularly good example of how an access-
based test would provide far easier analysis of the issues than is currently 
the case. Under its articles of incorporation, Federation Pharmacy Services 
was organized for the purposes of operating a nonprofit pharmaceutical 
service for the general public, with special discount rates for senior and 
handicapped citizens in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area.127 In its application 
for exemption, Federation proposed selling items to these groups at 5% 
below the lowest charge in the twin-city area.128 However, others would 
 123. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text. 
 124. See John D. Colombo, A Framework for Analyzing Exemption and UBIT Effects of Joint 
Ventures, 34 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 187 (2001). 
 125. Geisinger, 985 F.2d at 1210. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text (noting that 23% 
of Geisinger’s subscribers lived in medically underserved areas, and another 65% resided in counties 
that contained medically underserved areas).  
 126. See Fed’n Pharmacy Services, 625 F.2d at 804.  
 127. Id. at 805. 
 128. Id. at 806. 
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pay prevailing prices.129 In upholding the IRS’s denial of an exemption to 
Federation, the Eighth Circuit noted that Federation had no plan to provide 
free drugs to the poor or to sell items below cost, which it found crucial to 
establishing that Federation operated for a charitable purpose.130 
Essentially, the Eighth Circuit adopted a “charity-care” standard to 
differentiate an ordinary pharmacy from a charitable one and concluded 
that there was no evidence Federation did anything that distinguished it 
from an ordinary pharmacy. 
But the facts quite clearly demonstrate the access-based mission of 
Federation. Federation was formed by the Metropolitan Senior 
Federation—itself a nonprofit organization whose purpose was to enhance 
the well-being of senior citizens in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area.131 
Moreover, Federation was organized only after a discount-sale 
arrangement with a commercial pharmacy failed.132 This latter factor is 
one that I find most compelling: the service provided by Federation in 
nonprofit form was the direct result of the failure of a similar program 
negotiated with a for-profit provider. This is as clear an example of the 
failure of the private market (and government, which at the time of the 
case did not have a prescription drug benefit under Medicare or Medicaid 
for senior citizens) to provide an adequate service as one could possibly 
ask for. Thus had the Eighth Circuit focused on the access-enhancing 
mission of Federation, instead of the commercial nature of the services 
provided (sales of drugs), this case quite clearly would have come out the 
other way. Moreover, approval of exemption in this case is completely 
consistent with both the pluralism and economic theories of exemption 
discussed above: Federation Pharmacy not only filled a private 
market/government failure, but also brought a completely unique 
volunteer-based method of selling pharmaceuticals to the commercially-
dominated pharmacy world. 
Finally, I realize that an access-based test might result in a “race” to 
provide services in which the winner gets tax exemption while the entity 
coming in second does not. For example, an access-based test might 
support exemption for the first HMO to provide a broad range of health 
services to a medically underserved area but might not support the second 
or third HMO that simply replicates the services of the first. I view this 
result, however, as perfectly appropriate; after all, there are worse things 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 808. 
 131. Id. at 805. 
 132. Id. 
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than having tax policy align incentives so that organizations race each 
other to provide new services to a given population. If this test results in 
the winner getting the spoils of exemption, so be it. 
2. Arts Organizations, Community-Development Organizations, and 
Public-Interest Law Firms 
As noted in Part III, the “enhancing access” test also is completely 
consistent with the opinions and results in the classic Goldsboro and 
Plumstead Theater cases discussed above as well as IRS rulings regarding 
exemption for community-development organizations and public-interest 
law firms.133 Adopting “enhancing access” as the main test for exemption 
in these and other commercial similarity cases, however, would make the 
analysis in these cases far simpler. Courts such as those in Goldsboro and 
Plumstead would no longer have to hand-wring over whether these 
organizations are engaged in commercial activity; instead, the focus of the 
analysis would be on the organizations that were providing services 
previously unavailable from for-profit firms or serving populations 
otherwise ignored by the for-profit sector. In Goldsboro, this mission was 
obvious: bringing artistic works to the public that otherwise were not 
available via commercial galleries.134
Plumstead, however, offers an opportunity to explore the mission-focus 
benefits of an access-based test. Though the opinion in Plumstead noted 
the significant differences between the mission of a community theater and 
a for-profit one,135 in fact, Plumstead’s first theatrical venture was the 
production of a commercial play (First Monday in October, starring Henry 
Fonda).136 Nevertheless, there was significant evidence in the Plumstead 
case that detailed the theater’s access-based mission. The court noted, for 
example, that Plumstead’s board consisted of “a diversified group of 
individuals interested in the performing arts.”137 The record showed that 
Plumstead had already made arrangements with the Ambassador 
Foundation to use facilities at Ambassador College “as the site for its 
resident theatre with the hope of rebuilding the theatre audiences from 
Glendale, San Gabriel, Orange County, and San Bernadino County 
 133. Goldsboro Art League, 75 T.C. at 337; Plumstead Theater Soc’y, 74 T.C. at 1324. See 
discussion supra Part III.B–C. 
 134. See supra text at notes 66–67. 
 135. Plumstead Theater Soc’y, 74 T.C. at 1324, 1332–33.  
 136. Id. at 1328, 1331. 
 137. Id. at 1326. 
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. . . .”138 Plumstead also had formed a committee “to review and select 
appropriate dramatic plays in accordance with the highest literary and 
artistic standards”139 and planned to form a workshop in the Los Angeles 
area for new American playwrights as well as a fund to assist new 
playwrights in writing and producing new plays.140 In short, the record in 
Plumstead presents a perfect model of an organization that seriously 
focused on its access-based mission, with specific plans for executing that 
mission. 
Similarly, an access test would provide clear exemption guidelines for 
community-development organizations and public-interest law firms that 
would be generally consistent with the IRS’s current positions. As with the 
analysis of Goldsboro and Plumstead above, an access-based test would 
take us away from analyzing the commercial nature of the exact services 
provided and instead focus on the access-enhancing end result. Hence, 
community redevelopment organizations could act like a bank (providing 
loans) or investment banker (providing equity investments) or real estate 
developer (providing housing) as long as those services are directed at 
populations not currently served by the private market. This analysis is 
perfectly consistent with Rev. Rul. 74-587 discussed above;141 ditto for 
public-interest law firms, which would be limited to litigating cases that 
otherwise would not be litigated by private-law firms (e.g., providing 
access to the courts for cases and legal positions that otherwise would be 
unrepresented). This approach is also completely consistent with the IRS’s 
“economic viability” criterion stated in Rev. Rul. 75-74.142 On the other 
hand, using access as the key exemption criterion would call into question 
the IRS’s ruling that an organization formed to provide affordable 
moderate-income housing in a high-income neighborhood did not qualify 
for exemption because the organization was neither helping the poor nor 
addressing discrimination.143 An access-based test is broader than simply 
serving the poor or combating discrimination; if the focus of exemption is 
on bringing access to populations not currently served by the private 
market, then an organization providing moderate-income housing in an 
area that has none certainly is promoting that mission, just as much as a 
 138. Id. at 1327. 
 139. Id. at 1331. 
 140. Id. at 1326. 
 141. Rev. Rul. 74-587, 1974-2 C.B. 162; see discussion supra Part III.B. 
 142. Rev. Rul. 75-74, 1975-1 C.B. 152; see discussion supra Part III.C. 
 143. Rev. Rul. 70-585, 1970-2 C.B. 115, 116; see discussion supra Part III.B. 
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specialty-treatment hospital (such as a cancer center) that serves only 
paying patients.144
3. Religious Publishing and Craft Sales 
Another historic trouble spot for exempting commercially-similar 
services arises in cases dealing with exempt publishers and organizations 
that engage in the sales of handcrafts to help a specifically-designated 
group. With respect to publishers, the two classic cases in this area (both 
involving religious publishers) reached opposite results on virtually 
identical facts. In Scripture Press Foundation v. United States,145 the 
taxpayer, Scripture Press, was formed primarily to improve the quality of 
teaching texts for protestant Sunday Schools.146 Soon the company found 
itself highly successful in preparing and selling a variety of religious 
literature, accumulating over $1.6 million in surplus earnings by 1957.147 
As a result, the IRS revoked exempt status for the organization claiming 
that it, in effect, was nothing more than a for-profit publisher and hence no 
longer was operated primarily for charitable purposes. The Claims Court 
agreed with the IRS, noting that Scripture Press priced its products 
similarly to for-profit competitors and amassed significant profits.148 
Though it had an educational program aimed at promoting and expanding 
Sunday School instruction, the court found that expenditures on 
educational activities were “unaccountably small” in comparison to the 
surplus that Scripture Press accumulated annually.149 Accordingly, the 
court concluded that Scripture Press was not operated “primarily” for 
charitable purposes.150 Subsequently, the Tax Court and federal district 
courts upheld the IRS’s revocation of exemption in a number of other 
publishing cases.151
But in 1984, the Third Circuit reversed the revocation of exempt status 
for a religious publisher in Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing v. 
 144. Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94; see discussion supra Part II.A. 
 145. Scripture Press Found., 285 F.2d 800 (Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 985 (1962). 
 146. Id. at 803. 
 147. Id. at 804. 
 148. Id. at 804–05. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 806. 
 151. Inc. Tr. of Gospel Worker Soc’y v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 374, 381 (D. D.C. 1981), 
aff’d, 672 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Elisian Guild, Inc. v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 219 (D. Mass. 
1968), rev’d, 412 F.2d 121, 125 (1st Cir. 1969); Fides Publishers Ass’n v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 
924 (N.D. Ind. 1967); Presbyterian & Reformed Publ’g Co. v. Comm=r, 79 T.C. 1070 (1982), rev’d, 
743 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1984). 
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Commissioner,152 a case substantially similar to Scripture Press. The 
taxpayer in Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing was a highly profitable 
nondenominational religious publisher that priced its products at market. 
Though the Tax Court upheld an IRS revocation of exempt status on the 
ground of impermissible commercial hue based primarily on the large 
profits generated by the taxpayer’s publishing business,153 the Third 
Circuit reversed, noting that “success in terms of audience reached and 
influence exerted, in and of itself, should not jeopardize the tax-exempt 
status of organizations that remain true to their stated goals.”154 A 
charitable organization, according to the Third Circuit, should be able to 
make money to expand its audience and influence and doing so does not 
make the organization any less charitable. Similarly, the Tax Court 
approved exemption in several “resale shop” cases—situations in which a 
nonprofit enterprise primarily operated a business selling crafts produced 
by a particular group. In the late 1970s, for example, the Tax Court 
approved exemption for an organization that imported, purchased and sold 
artists’ crafts,155 and an organization that purchased and sold products 
manufactured by blind individuals.156
Once again, a focus on access is the best way to harmonize these cases. 
Rather than focusing on vague indicia of “commercial hue,” courts might 
better employ their energies in determining whether the publisher offered a 
product otherwise unavailable from the private market. In both Scripture 
Press and Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing, for example, the record 
indicated that both organizations were formed because of a failure of the 
private market to supply the types of religious texts that they published.157 
Similarly, the eligibility of “craft stores” for exemption could be measured 
 152. Presbyterian & Reformed Publ’g, 743 F.2d at 148. 
 153. Presbyterian & Reformed Publ’g, 79 T.C. at 1070. 
 154. Presbyterian & Reformed Publ’g, 743 F.2d at 158. 
 155. Aid to Artisans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 202 (1978). The organization claimed that its 
charitable purposes were “(1) helping disadvantaged artisans in poverty stricken countries to subsist 
and to preserve their craft; and (2) furnishing services to tax-exempt museums by providing museum 
stores with representative handicrafts from disadvantaged countries.” Id. at 209. 
 156. Industrial Aid for the Blind v. Comm’r, 73 T.C. 96 (1979). The charitable purpose was to 
provide employment for the blind and thus came within the regulations’ statement that a charitable 
purpose includes “relief of the poor and distressed or underprivileged.” Id. at 100–01. See Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(d) (2002). 
 157. See Scripture Press Found., 285 F.2d at 803 (noting that Scripture Press had been formed to 
address “the poor quality of existing teaching materials for Bible instruction in Sunday schools.”); 
Presbyterian & Reformed Publ’g, 743 F.2d at 151 (independent publishers characterized P&R’s books 
as “lacking in ‘common ground’ with the ‘nonreformed mind’ and ‘offensive’ to all but the ‘truly 
reformed.’). 
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by whether such organizations made goods available to the public from a 
unique source that previously were unavailable. 
4. Two Final Examples: The Religious Health Foods Store and the 
Downtown Y 
Two final examples help seal the case for how an access-based test 
would make analyzing exemption for commercial similarity cases much 
simpler. The first involves a case that is routinely part of teaching 
materials on tax-exempt organizations; the second, involves a perennial 
problem that has not yet been litigated or formally ruled upon by the IRS. 
In Living Faith, Inc. v. Commissioner,158 the organization seeking 
exemption (Living Faith, Inc.) operated two vegetarian restaurants and 
health food stores in Illinois. Living Faith based its application for 
exemption on the grounds that it was formed to promote the religious 
doctrines of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, which “believe that the 
concept of health is permeated with religious meaning”; “[g]ood health, 
according to Seventh-Day Adventists, promotes virtuous conduct and is 
furthered by a vegetarian diet and abstention from tobacco, alcohol, and 
caffeine.”159 In short, Living Faith claimed that its activities were wholly 
consistent with being a “religious” organization and promoting the 
Seventh-Day Adventist faith.160
The Seventh Circuit disagreed. Its analysis, however, focused on the 
commercial nature of Living Faith’s activities; the court noted that Living 
Faith’s operations were essentially identical to for-profit restaurants and 
health food stores, including their pricing schedule, location in shopping 
centers, similar hours, and use of advertising.161 Much of the opinion is 
devoted to distinguishing Living Faith’s activities from other cases in 
which businesses operated by churches or church-based organizations 
were held not to interfere with exempt status.162
Under an access-based test, this case would have been far simpler to 
decide. Put simply, Living Faith had no access-based mission. Its 
restaurants and stores did not serve populations that otherwise could not 
access a vegetarian diet or health foods. It did not provide services (sale of 
 158. Living Faith, Inc. v. Comm’r, 950 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 159. Id. at 367. 
 160. Living Faith v. Comm’r, 950 F.2d at 369–70 (“Living Faith contends that it operates its 
restaurants and health food stores with the exclusive, tax-exempt purpose of furthering the religious 
work of the Seventh-day Adventist Church as a health ministry.”). 
 161. Id. at 373–74. 
 162. Id. at 373–76. 
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health foods and vegetarian meals) that were unavailable in the private 
market; indeed, the opinion noted that Living Faith’s stores directly 
competed with for-profit restaurants and health food suppliers. Its 
revenues from its business operations did not appear devoted to an 
evangelistic mission or increasing access to Seventh-Day Adventist 
religious doctrine. Living Faith simply had no mission of enhancing 
access; thus, under an access-based test, the organization would have been 
denied exemption without such extensive analysis of the “commercial 
hue” of its activities or lengthy explanations of how its commercial 
operations differed in scope from commercial operations carried on by 
other churches or religious organizations. 
The second example is what those of us who teach in the nonprofit area 
sometimes refer to as the “Downtown Y.”163 The general problem is this. 
Suppose that a YMCA (traditionally an exempt charity) operates a facility 
near the center-business district of a major city. It offers all the amenities 
of several for-profit competitors in the same general geographic area and 
charges similar fees for admission. Should the Y be tax-exempt? Under 
the traditional analysis, exemption has been granted or denied to health 
clubs based upon a variety of factors mirroring the community-benefit test 
applied to health care: whether the facilities were open to all members of 
the community; whether the organization provided fitness education 
programs; and whether there were specific programs for the poor.164
As with health care, the analysis of exempt status for the downtown Y 
would be more focused if the IRS and courts recognized that they are 
really applying an access-based test. Thus when the Y has an access-based 
mission, providing open facilities for the general community and programs 
particularly targeted at underserved groups (e.g., youth, the elderly, the 
poor), the Y qualifies for exemption notwithstanding its commercially-
similar services. However, without these access programs the Y is nothing 
more than another health club providing services that are already available 
to those who can already purchase them and exemption is not warranted. 
 163. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGS., supra note 14, at 478; JAMES J. FISHMAN & 
STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: TEACHER’S MANUAL 77–79 (2000) [hereinafter 
FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, TEACHER’S MANUAL]. 
 164. See, e.g., Clubs of Cal. for Fair Competitions v. County Tax Assessor, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 247 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding property tax exemption for Oakland, CA YMCA); Janne G. 
Gallagher, Oakland YMCA Wins Property Tax Exemption, 6 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 511 (1992); Cf. 
Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of Columbia-Willamette v. Dept. of Revenue, 784 P.2d 1086 (1989) 
(upholding Oregon Department of Revenue decision to deny exemption to downtown Portland 
YMCA). The Portland decision was later reversed by the Oregon Department of Revenue after the 
Portland Y initiated programs aimed at family and youth as well as other services for the surrounding 
community. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, TEACHER’S MANUAL, supra note 163, at 78. 
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The Downtown Y situation, moreover, is another excellent example of 
how basing exemption in commercial-similarity cases on enhancing access 
would force nonprofits that provide commercial services to focus their 
charitable mission: if the Downtown Y wants tax exemption, it will have 
to demonstrate a commitment to programs for traditionally underserved 
groups (youth, the elderly, the poor) and public access to its facilities. 
C. Access in Other Exemption Analysis 
Although a doctrinal test of “enhancing access” has its most direct 
application to the problem of identifying exempt organizations in cases of 
“commercial similarity,” the access concept might help explain some other 
doctrines surrounding exempt status that affect non-commercial 
organizations as well. For example, in Bob Jones University v. United 
States the Supreme Court held that a school that discriminated against 
racial minorities could not be tax-exempt on the grounds that 
discrimination violated “fundamental public policy.”165 The public policy 
doctrine, however, has raised a host of unresolved issues. Justice Powell, 
concurring in Bob Jones, warned that a focus on whether an organization’s 
activities conformed to government policy “ignores the important role 
played by tax exemptions in encouraging diverse, indeed often sharply 
conflicting, activities and viewpoints.”166 In addition, the Court’s opinion 
fails to give much guidance regarding when a policy is “fundamental,” 
leaving open questions whether exempt organizations might be able to 
discriminate on the basis of gender, sexual orientation, or other 
classifications.167 Indeed, even the question of racial discrimination is a 
slippery one: for example, is it contrary to fundamental public policy to 
discriminate in favor of minority students?168
If, however, one jettisoned the notion of “fundamental public policy” 
and embraced an access-based analysis, then many of these questions 
 165. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 592–94 (1983) (holding organization not charitable when it 
violates fundamental public policy; policy against racial discrimination is “fundamental.”). 
 166. Id. at 609 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 167. See, e.g., HILL & MANCINO, supra note 38, ¶ 7.05[3]; David A. Brennan, Charities and the 
Constitution: Evaluating the Role of Constitutional Principles in Determining the Scope of Tax Law’s 
Public Policy Limitation for Charities, 5 FLA. TAX. REV. 779 (2002); Martin Ginsburg, Sex 
Discrimination and the IRS: Public Policy and the Charitable Deduction, 10 TAX NOTES 27 (1980); J. 
Christine Harris, Should Boy Scouts’ Policy on Gays Preclude Tax-Exempt Status?, 31 EXEMPT ORG. 
TAX REV. 32, 32–33 (2001). 
 168. See David A. Brennan, The Power of the Treasury: Racial Discrimination, Public Policy and 
“Charity” In Contemporary Society, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 389 (2000); HILL & MANCINO, supra 
note 38, ¶ 7.04[4]. 
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would go away. At the very least, a focus on access as a central criterion 
of exemption would mean that an organization must permit access by all 
members of the community; or put conversely, an organization that denies 
access to a specific group will be denied exemption. Such a position, of 
course, would cut a very wide swath through current exempt 
organizations—denying exemption to private single-gender schools, for 
example169—but it would end the current uncertainty regarding the 
application of the fundamental public policy test and the potential for 
“forced conformity” to the majority view that so worried Justice Powell.  
VI. GENERAL SUMMARY 
When nonprofit organizations provide services that are similar to those 
provided by for-profit organizations, the decision whether the nonprofit is 
eligible for tax-exemption has often involved tortured analysis regarding 
the “commercial hue” of the services provided by the nonprofit and/or the 
resulting “community benefits.” As this Article has demonstrated, 
however, most of the analysis undertaken by the IRS and courts in these 
cases of commercial similarity is consistent with an overriding principle of 
enhancing access: either by serving traditionally-underserved populations 
or by bringing services to the general population that were previously 
unavailable from the for-profit sector. Making “enhancing access” the 
main test of exemption would simply make explicit what already is largely 
implicit, which in turn would both simplify the analysis of these cases and 
help make sense of some IRS positions (particularly in the health care 
field) that do not make any sense under the current community-benefit 
test. An access test, moreover, is both consistent with the major theoretical 
underpinnings of exemption and would have the salutary effect of forcing 
exempt organizations that engage in commercial services to focus their 
mission to differentiate themselves from their for-profit counterparts.  
An access-based test of exemption, of course, will not solve all the 
analytical problems regarding eligibility for exempt status. An access-
based test, for example, would provide little help in defining what is a 
“religious organization” or an “educational organization” under 
§ 501(c)(3). Even in these cases, however, recognizing the underlying role 
of access in exemption analysis might help explain certain exemption 
decisions—such as the denial of exemption to organizations (e.g., racially 
 169. One should remember that this Article is concerned only with federal income tax exemption; 
purely private single-gender schools could still legally exist—they just would not be granted tax 
exemption.  
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segregated schools) that specifically deny access to certain groups. In any 
event, focusing on access as the central criterion for exemption in 
commercial-similarity cases would greatly improve the legal environment 
for dealing with these peculiarly difficult exemption cases, and this benefit 
alone is enough of a reason for the IRS and courts to consider this 
approach. 
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